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PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES FROM KRIPKE’S ‘SEMANTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS ON MODAL LOGIC’
JOHN DIVERS
Abstract. In ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Kripke articulates his project in
the discourse of “possible worlds”. There has been much philosophical discussion of whether
endorsement of the Kripke semantics brings ontological commitment to possible worlds.
However, that discussion is less than satisfactory because it has been conducted without the
necessary investigation of the surrounding philosophical issues that are raised by the Kripke
semantics. My aim in this paper is to map out the surrounding territory and to commence
that investigation. Among the surrounding issues, and my attitudes to them, are these: (1)
the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the semantic
theory has been under-exploited; (2) there has been under-estimation of what is achieved
by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) there is a methodological imperative to co-ordinate
a clear conception of the purposes of the impure theory with an equally clear conception of
the content the theory; (4) there is a need to support by argument claims about how such a
semantic theory, even in an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and
metaphysics; (5) greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes
on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly distin-
guishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from variation across
such models and, finally, (6) the normative nature of the concept of applicability, of the pure
semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely ignored.
Keywords: Kripke; possible-world semantics; pure and applied semantics; models of modal
space; applicability.
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
The two-fold aim of ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’ (Kripke 1963) is to
show (in outline): (i) that a family of quantified modal logics can be supplied with a
theory of validity of one standard kind (the model-theoretic kind) and, subsequently,
(ii) that many such logics have related completeness properties. Kripke (p.64)1 in-
troduces and narrates his project via an intriguing reference to possible worlds, the
intent and ultimate significance of which is unclear. This choice of idiom, naturally,
inspires great philosophical interest: but especially so in light of his readers’ aware-
ness of the far more sustained and less casual invocation of possible-world talk in
his later philosophical masterpiece Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1980). In this pa-
per, I shall touch on those issues that have dominated the philosophical discussion
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arising from Kripke (1963) in the subsequent half-century. But my main purpose is to
present and commend a broader perspective on the surrounding philosophical terri-
tory within which those well excavated issues are only a part of what is visible and
important. Among the salient themes of the broader approach are these: (1) that
the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the
semantic theory has been under-exploited; (2) that there has been under-estimation
of what is achieved by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) that there is a method-
ological imperative to co-ordinate a clear conception of the purposes of the impure
theory with an equally clear conception of the content the theory; (4) that there is
a need to support by argument claims about how such a semantic theory, even in
an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and metaphysics;
(5) that greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes
on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly
distinguishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from vari-
ation across such models and, finally, (6) that the normative nature of the concept of
applicability, of the pure semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely
ignored.
1.2. The Germ
A possible-worlds semantic theory is a theory that aims to illuminate certain semantic
features of expressions and which deploys the concept of a possible world in order
to do so. The possible-worlds semantic theory intimated in Kripke (1963) is an in-
terpretation of quantified modal logics and the semantic feature it aims, primarily, to
illuminate is validity.2 Kripke writes:
To get a semantics for modal logic we introduce the notion of a (normal)
modal structure . . . [which] . . . is an ordered triple (G, K , R) where K is a
set, R is a reflexive relation on K and G ∈ K . (p.64)
The semantic theory intimated here is one whose concepts are those of the mathe-
matical theory of models and those concepts do not include that of a possible world.
The intimation of a possible-worlds semantic theory arrives with the subsequent com-
ment:
Intuitively, we look at matters thus: K is the set of all ‘possible worlds’; G is
the ‘real world’ and . . . H1RH2 means intuitively that H2 is ‘possible relative
to’ H1 i.e. every proposition true in H2 is possible in H1. (p.64)
But the non-mathematical discourse of possible-worlds is thus introduced here with-
out any clear guidance as to how we are understand the intended significance of
this development. Between what appears to be scare quotation (‘possible worlds’)
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and the appeal to intuition (‘intuitively’) do we have a recommendation to think
of matters this way or not? And, recommended or not, is the thought in question
that this possible-worlds interpretation is distinguished from others by being the in-
tended interpretation? Or is it the quite different thought that thinking in terms of
possible-worlds is a user-friendly, but otherwise strictly insignificant, heuristic. To
clarify matters we need the distinction between pure and impure conceptions, and
versions, of a semantic theory. That sound advice was first issued by Plantinga (1974,
p.126–8) and it appears to have been well taken. For it is now a well established ritual
in philosophical discussions that broach possible-worlds semantics that there should
be mention of the availability of a pure (formal, mathematical, algebraic) conception
of the project. However, subsequent observance of the distinction is often less than
diligent and, certainly, I contend, the philosophical value of implementing it rigor-
ously has not been maximised. In this paper, I aim to prosecute the distinction to
full effect as the basis of a fruitful re-drawing of the map of the philosophical ter-
ritory that surrounds Kripkean possible-worlds semantics and which aims to bring
neglected regions to the fore.
2. QUIDO Logics and QUIDO Structures
Consider a first-order logic with identity, given purely syntactically by: (a) a grammar
on a vocabulary (∧, ∼, ⊃, ↔, ∃, ∀, =, x1, x2 . . . F1, G1 . . . F2, G2 . . . F3, G3 . . .) and
(b) a classical proof-theory. On that basis, we assume that we have fixed and at our
disposal the class of theorems of such a logic. We then extend the logical vocabulary
to include two sentential monadic operators, box “” and diamond “◊”. Each of these
has exactly the same syntactic profile as “∼”, so substituting either for an occurrence
of “∼” preserves well-formedness. “” is taken as part of the primitive lexicon and
“◊” is introduced by definition, thus: A=df ∼◊∼A. It merits emphasis that in Kripke
(1963) there are no proper names or constant singular terms of any other kind in this
vocabulary: not in the primitive lexicon, nor constructed out of it.
The class of logics (“systems”) that ultimately concern Kripke (1963), I shall la-
bel QUIDO logics. These are so labelled because they are various proof-theoretic en-
hancements of QUantified non-modal logic with identity that are Intensional with
respect to the box (“”) of our Dual Operators.
We can achieve a rough and locally adequate proof-theoretic characterization of
intensionality as follows: a logic is intensional whenever when it is necessary and
sufficient for the unrestricted inter-substitutivity of A and B that (A↔ B) is a the-
orem. The specific intensional systems under consideration, then, are the quantified
versions of the propositional systems that are labelled (respectively), M, B, S4 and
S5, and which are constructed as follows.
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The system M has the following axiom schemes and rules:
A0. The theorems of the propositional logic3
A1. A⊃ A
A2. (A⊃ B) ⊃ (A⊃ B)
R1. A, A⊃ B / B
R2. A / A
We obtain the system S4 by adding to M the axiom scheme
S4. A⊃ A
We obtain the system B by adding to M the axiom scheme
Br. A⊃ ◊A
We obtain the system S5 by adding to M the axiom scheme
S5. ◊A⊃ ◊A
Above and throughout, A, B, C . . . are taken for complex formulae that are built
from atomic formulae P, Q, R . . . by use of the connectives ∧, ∼ and . All such
formula-expressions, atomic or complex, are characterized as ‘propositional variables’
(p.64).
There ends the syntactic account of QUIDO logics and we turn now to the seman-
tics.
The pure model-theoretic interpretation of classical first-order logic (with iden-
tity) is given via a class of models, in each of which there is a domain set d an a
assignment function, ψ, that maps: (i) atomic predicates of the language to exten-
sions from the domain of the model and (ii) closed sentences onto semantic values in
the range {T, F} according to familiar recursive rules governing the first-order logical
constants. The pure Kripkean interpretation of the QUIDO logics is given by enriching
such an interpretation two-fold.
Firstly, we interpret whichever IDO logic is the propositional core of the QUIDO
logic. This calls for an IDO model-structure 〈K , R〉 involving a set K on which there is
a binary relation R. A model on such a structure is a binary function, φ, from pairs
〈P, H〉 into the range {T, F} where: P varies over atomic formulae, H varies over K-
members and {T, F} are pure set-theoretic objects that are not further defined or
identified. Taking for granted the cases of the constants of ordinary propositional
logic, the assignment function is defined for the characteristic dual operators of the
IDO logic as follows:
φ〈A, H〉= T iff
 ∀H ′(((H ′ ∈ K ∧ R(HH ′)) ⊃ (φ〈A, H ′〉= T ));
otherwise, φ〈A, H〉= F ;
Principia 20(1): 1–44 (2016).
Philosophical Issues from Kripke’s ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’ 5
φ〈◊A, H〉= T iff
 ∃H ′((H ′ ∈ K ∧ R(HH ′))∧ (φ〈A, H ′〉= T ));
otherwise, φ〈◊A, H〉= F.
Secondly, for the interpretation of the full QUIDO logic, that is built around the
IDO core, we require a QUIDO model structure, 〈R, K , D,ψ(H)〉 in which: K and R
are as before, D is a domain-set and ψ is a function from K into the power set of D
(so each K-member has a local domainψ(H)). A model on a QUIDO model-structure
has two components: (i) a function ξ〈F, H〉 takes every pair of a primitive predicate
and a K-member into an extension, which is a subset of the local domain ψ(H) and
(ii) an expanded version of the binary function, φ, from pairs 〈P, H〉 into the range
{T, F} according to recursive rules for each of the primitive QUIDO constants. The
rules for the IDO constants are as per the IDO models and those for the primitive
quantifier ∃ are as per the orthodox models for first-order logic (p.64–5). In particular,
a quantificational formula ∃xA in which x is bound, is evaluated at H by taking the
quantifier to range over only the local domain local domainψ(H) (not over the global
domain D).
All of the above, being part of the proof-theory or the model theory for QUIDO
logics, is within the jurisdiction of mathematical logic and raises only those philo-
sophical questions that (such) mathematics, in general, raises. This claim is scarcely
contestable, and it is endorsed by — inter alia: Plantinga (1974, p.126–7), Quine
(1980a, p.173–4), Forbes (1985, p.70–1), Lewis (1986, p.17) and Williamson (2013,
p.85). To elaborate in the customary way, the semantic part of this “algebraic” con-
ception of QUIDO logics is a pure semantic theory. As such, it says nothing about the
existence, nature or extent of possible worlds, of possibilia, or of possibility of any
kind. Equally, it says nothing about the existence, nature or extent of the angels, or
the cities or anything else (beyond, perhaps, the pure sets) that might — for all we
know — instantiate one or other such pure structure. To serve the philosophical pur-
poses of distinguishing rigorously the sort of pure semantic theory just introduced
from any further concerns that might arise from its further associations, we ought to
speak of such a pure theory, and the class of logics it interprets, only in the austere
and non-suggestive terminology that has been used so far. In particular, it is impor-
tant to resist the temptation, when matters are contained in this sphere to call the
logics modal logics and to call such an interpretation a possible-worlds semantics. It
would be no less tendentious, and just as unhelpful, to call these things celestial log-
ics and angelic semantics, or urban logics and metropolitan semantics. To adopt and
implement this policy on nomenclature is to obtain very cheap insurance against the
confusions, conflations and illicit presuppositions that are apt to take hold if we lapse
into speaking otherwise.
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3. The Pure Semantics
The Kripkean pure semantic theories described have the potential both to host vari-
ous sorts of semantically-based elucidations of modality and also to import associated
philosophical commitments. That potential, in both respects, is fulfilled when a pure
semantic theory is applied to a modality and such applications will be discussed ex-
tensively in later parts of the paper. However, by focusing on pure QUIDO structures
and models on them, we can anticipate the places at which an impure semantic con-
cept of a certain kind and shape can take root and at which associated conceptual
and metaphysical commitments are apt to ensue.
3.1. IDO Structures
Recall the IDO model structure, 〈K , R〉 with binary relation R, set K and models in
which an assignment function, φ, takes pairs of 〈 formulas, K-members 〉 into one
of the semantic values {T, F}. This structure genus can be differentiated into species
according to the natural mathematical properties of its elements. Since K is a set, the
first natural difference to consider is that between the empty case and the non-empty
case. Since R is a binary relation, the salient differentiating characteristics to consider
are those definable out of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. For present purposes
we need attend only to these differentia of K and R, and henceforth we consider
only species of structure in which K is non-empty.4 Respect for the initial epistemo-
logical independence of the semantics from the syntax motivates the introduction of
proof-theoretically neutral names for all species of structure. Thus, one species of IDO
structure will be labelled the REF-structure, because it is defined by the requirement
that the R-relation should be a reflexive relation (on a non-empty set). Similarly, we
have the SYMM-structure (R is symmetric), the TRANS-structure (R is transitive) and
obvious composites of these terms such as the SYMM-TRANS-structure (R is symmet-
ric and transitive) . . . . and also the EQUIV-structure (as a convenient label for what
would canonically be called the REF-SYMM-TRANS structure).
The strongest natural semantic feature of formulas that is suggested by these
pure resources, is one that is definable at the level of the genus (that is, on all IDO-
structures), thus:
(ULTRA-VAL) ULTRA-VAL (A) iff ∀φ′ on all IDO-structures, and ∀H ∈ K ,
φ′(A, H) = T .
The next natural kind of semantic feature suggested is definable on the same
pattern but — down a taxonomic level — in terms of species IDO-structures, thus —
for example:
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(EQUIV-VAL) EQUIV-VAL (A) iff ∀φ′ on all EQUIV-IDO-structures and ∀H ∈ K ,
φ′(A, H) = T .
I note three points about Kripke (1963) in relation to the above. Firstly, Kripke
never isolates IDO structures: the simplest structures he considers are IDO+ struc-
tures (see immediately below). Secondly, Kripke does not define, or even consider,
a VAL concept at the level of structure genus: no concept considered is at the level
of our ULTRA-VAL, all are at the (species) level of our EQUIV-VAL. Thirdly, Kripke
restricts his attention throughout to those IDO-structures (and subsequently QUIDO-
structures) that are of the REF species. Since he does so with an application in mind,
the restriction is not made in the spirit of purity.5 Nonetheless, since it simplifies
matters to follow Kripke’s lead on this point, I shall do so.
3.2. IDO+ Structures
The simplest model-structures considered in Kripke (1963) are not IDO structures
but richer IDO+ structures in which there is an additional place for a distinguished
K-member, G, — thus: 〈G, K , R〉. The genus of IDO+ structures is differentiated in
exactly the same way as the genus of IDO structures is differentiated: that is on K
and on R as indicated above. The primary theoretical facility afforded by the richer
structures is (partial) de-relativization of our concept of evaluation. Instead of a value
(T or F) attaching to a formula at a K-member and in a model, it can be attached to
a formula in a model tout court — thus:
(φ-MOD) φ∗(A) = n =df iff φ(A, G) = n (for n a variable over {T, F}).
We can view (φ-MOD) as intimating an explicit and reductive definition of its
definiendum in terms of the (doubly-relativised) primitive predicate of the theory,
φ(A, H). However, in his consideration of IDO logics and QUIDO logics as logics of
standard modalities, Kripke (1963) never puts the IDO+ structures to this work —
nor, indeed, to any other.6,7
3.3. QUIDO+ Structures
A QUIDO model structure 〈K , R, D,ψ(H)〉 is an IDO model structure enriched by a
domain-set D and a function, ψ, from K into the power set of D (so each K-member
has a local domain ψ(H)). A QUIDO+ model structure is similarly built on a core
IDO+ structure, thus: 〈G, K , R, D,ψ(H)〉. All of the closed formulas of the QUIDO
logic are assigned semantic values by models on these structures: values at a K-
Member in the model (QUIDO) or values in the model (QUIDO+).
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QUIDO structures afford obvious opportunities to further differentiate species,
qua mathematically natural kinds, within the genus. We still, from the IDO case, dif-
ferentiate according to features of R (and insist on non-empty K). But we may now
combine that with differentiation by features of the function ψ(H) and, in particu-
lar, by features of the domain, D, of that function. The role of ψ(H) is to assign a
local domain to each K-member, and among the set-theoretically salient and natural
differentiating conditions on domain-variation (for a structure) are these: that each
subset of D should be the domain of at least one K-member; that the intersection
of distinct K-domains should always be empty; that the value of ψ(H) is constant
across K-members and that at every K-member, H,ψ(H) = D.8 I assume, henceforth,
that the primary species of QUIDO structures are those defined by such mathemati-
cally natural conditions on ψ(H) and by those on R that were introduced previously.
As throughout this pure phase of the enquiry, it is an open question whether any
such mathematically natural kinds of structure will prove salient in any particular
application of the pure semantics.
It is noted that the species of QUIDO structure that are circumscribed in Kripke
(1963) are constrained only with respect to R: they are entirely unconstrained with
respect to ψ(H). Thus various notable species of model-structures (for each R-kind)
are admitted. These include — notably: those with models whose K-members have in-
tersecting domains and those with models whose K-members have varying domains.
For these varying domain models there are admitted two significant sub-cases: (i)
downward variation, in which some K-member domains ψ(H) have members that
are not members of the distinguished domain ψ(G) and (ii) upward variation, in
which members of ψ(G) are absent from some other ψ(H). The species of QUIDO
structures that we are asked to consider in Kripke (1963) are less VAL-friendly than
those in which more constraints on ψ(H) are imposed — for example, as by Kripke
(1959). For absence of constraints breeds variety of models, and variety of models
makes for variety of potential counter-models to VAL theses. Famously, the Kripke
(1963) deregulation of the domain assignment function has the effect of inVALi-
dating the Barcan Formula (BF), its Converse (CBF) (Barcan 1946) and (double)
Necessitism (∀∃)):
(BF) ∀xA⊃ ∀xA
(CBF) ∀xA⊃ ∀xA
(∀∃) ∀x∃y(y = x)9
QUIDO+ structures, the other structures that we might develop from the re-
sources they already encompass and models on these structures are further differ-
entiable into species that are both mathematically (fairly) natural and applicable to
modality.10 It is noted that — in the course of his brief remarks on certain other
QUIDO models that he does not himself exploit — Kripke expresses his conception
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of his project in a telling way — thus:
For the purposes of modal logic, we hold that [his own models and others]
represent alternative conventions. All are tenable. (p.66)
It is difficult to ignore the implicature that there might be purposes other than those
of a semantic theory of modal logic, for which establishing the status of a type of
model as a tenable convention is not good enough. So we have here a warning about
inferring from adequacy to one purpose, to which the semantic theory speaks directly,
adequacy to another such purpose, to which it does not speak directly.
3.4. The Pure Work of QUIDO Structures and their Relatives
It is important to identify the work that is done by the pure QUIDO structures, and
their relatives, themselves prior to, and independently of, any application to which
they might be put.
Certain proof-theoretic results might be established without any appeal to se-
mantic structures. These are intra-syntactic results. Equally, certain results about the
relations and orderings among species of structures might be established without
appeal to any proof-theoretic considerations. These are intra-semantic results. But
by considering how proof-theories relate to QUIDO-structures, in particular, we can
further illuminate both and establish inter-categorical results. For the purposes of
this paper, there are three kinds of such inter-categorical result that deserve to be
highlighted.
Firstly, and crucially, soundness and completeness are inter-categorical matters par
excellence. QUIDO structures allow us to establish lemmas about what is X-VAL over
various species of structure X. The X-completeness and X-soundness of a proof theory
ϑ is a matter of its capacity to generate as theorems all and (respectively) only such
X-Valid formulas. Kripke reports completeness theorems for the quantified versions of
each of the systems M, B, S4 and S5 (p.70) referring to their demonstration in Kripke
(1959). Once these results are established, it is understandable that the nomenclature
for QUIDO structures should be altered to conform to the proof-theories that they
perfectly fit — hence the Kripkean terminology of S4-structures, S5-structures etc.
However, it promotes a greater appreciation of the inter-categorical results to set out
by using an independent semantic vocabulary and reporting results in an explicitly
inter-categorical way. Thus, the report that the system S4 is sound and complete
with respect to REF-TRANS structures is one that conveys more of the achievement
than does the nonplussing report the axiom system S4 is so related to S4 structures.
What needs to be appreciated is that a class of formulas that is natural by one sort of
criterion has been discovered to be the very same class of formulas that is natural by
a quite different sort of criterion.
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Secondly, it is open to us to define various inter-categorical concepts of optimality
of QUIDO logics and, building on the soundness and completeness results, to estab-
lish pertinent results about these concepts in extension. One such optimality feature
is that of being the strongest QUIDO logic (proof theory) that is both sound and
complete with respect to the simplest species of model structure. Another such op-
timality feature is being the weakest proof theory that is both sound and complete
with respect to the most demanding kind of model structure.
Thirdly, the soundness and completeness results yield subsequent Safety Results
that are sufficient to justify the practice of doing QUIDO logic by proxy in the calculus
of first-order logic. The logic of the pure semantic theory, through which pure seman-
tic results are established is a first-order logic. Therefore, we can use first-order logic
to set about establishing the VAL-status of any QUIDO formula A. But given the crucial
inter-categorical results in the background, we are then entitled to draw conclusions
about the THEOREM-Status of any QUIDO formula A. So a first-order demonstration
of X-VAL for a QUIDO formula, A, allows us, given completeness, allows us to infer the
X-Theoremhood of A. What we can also do, and what we cannot (typically) do within
the proof theory alone is to demonstrate via first-order methods Non-theoremhood
in a QUIDO logic. For a first-order demonstration of X-INVAL allows us, given sound-
ness, to infer Non-(X-Theoremhood). Thus, all that can be established by the use of
the proof theory for QUIDO System X — and more! — can be established by the
deployment of first-order methods alone.
In sum, even though they rest on semantic considerations it is within the realm
of pure semantic considerations that all of the following, inter-categorical matters for
QUIDO logics — and any subsequent application of them — are framed and settled:
VAL-ness, SOUND-ness, COMPLETE-ness, OPTIMALITY and SAFETY. And all of this
is achieved by QUIDO structures with no need of any enrichment of them.
The formation of QUIDO+ structures, as with the formation of IDO+ structures
affords a facility that Kripke (1963) does not exploit: that is, the definition of semantic
evaluation relative to a single index (φ) as a special case of semantic evaluation
relative to an index pair (φ, H).
Another relative of a QUIDO structure is its distinguished model. I mark this
feature explicitly in the vocabulary of the pure semantic theory by a singular-term-
forming operator “!”, so that “Π!” means the distinguished model of structure species (or
genus)Π. The facility offered by this new distinguishing move, as with its predecessor
is (further) de-relativization: now, the definition of semantic evaluation simpliciter
(*) as a special case of semantic evaluation relative to a single index (a model index)
(φ). To have a value simpliciter or absolutely is to have that value at the distinguished
K-member in the distinguished model:
(ABS) ∗(A) = n iff (φ(A, G) = n)∧φ = Π!
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We do not need distinguished models or distinguished elements of models when-
ever the definitions and results require only that we consider what is the case for
all models (for an arbitrary model) or only what is the case for every K-member in
every model (for an arbitrary K-member). In that event, QUIDO structures (or IDO
structures) suffice.
It is to be noted, then, that Kripke (1963) in his treatment of standard modality
does not make this new distinguishing move (among models) either. There is no play
with distinguished models (of any structure) and there is no attempt to define — by
that route or otherwise — a formula’s having simpliciter the semantic values T, F.11
3.5. Philosophical Commitment Points in QUIDO Structures and their
Relatives
I presume Quinean (orthodox and conservative) sufficient conditions of ontological
commitment — thus: one who endorses a semantic theory is ontologically committed
— at least pro tem — to the sets over which it appears to quantify and to whatever
things one is committed to taking to be the members of those sets.12 Accordingly, I
shall presume that one who endorses a pure Kripkean semantic theory for QUIDO
logics is committed (pro tem) to the existence of those sets, and their members, that
are intimated by the models of the relevant structures. The distinctive ontological
commitments that arise from an applied version of such a pure semantic theory then
arise, potentially, from two structure points in the models. Firstly, there is intimated
in all relevant structures, models that contain a non-empty K-set. The bare minimum
(pro tem) commitment associated with any application of any pure QUIDO semantic
theory is commitment to at least one such model, to one such set and to one such
set-member. However, and although it is very often overlooked, the potential for on-
tological commitment to K-members significantly outstrips commitment to any K-set
that is an element of any single model. For, in all foreseeable cases, the theories as-
serted will be many-model theories, and with such theories comes commitment to
an uberset, K+, which is the union of all the K-sets from across the models.13 So the
ontological K-hierarchy has uberset K+ at the top, then sets K and then K-members.
Secondly, in all QUIDO structures — and sparing repetition of the reasoning from
the K-case — there is also potential commitment at every level of the ontological D-
hierarchy, which has uberset D+ at the top, then model-sets D and then D-members.
Various points of potential conceptual or ideological commitment are also identi-
fiable in and around QUIDO structures and their relatives. I shall not, here, open the
question of the differences between conceptual and ideological commitments and the
different conditions under which these different kinds of commitment ensue. Suffice
to say that we ought to be sensitive to those meaningful but non-quantificational
facets or aspects of the theory that at least raise the question of such non-ontological
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commitments. And there are two salient cases of this sort. Firstly, within both IDO+
and QUIDO+ structures there is position, definitive of those structures, G, intimating
a feature of K-member-distinction. Secondly, assignable to any model structure term,
there is the ! label intimating a feature of Π-model-distinction.
This concludes the account of the pure semantics for IDO and QUIDO logics that
can be distilled from Kripke (1963).
4. The Application of the Pure Semantics to Modalities
4.1. Applications in General and Modal Applications in Particular
The impure semantic riches suggested by such pure Kripkean semantic theories have
proved not so much a philosophers’ paradise as a philosophers’ playground. For, per-
haps impatient to grab what appears to lie in wait, we philosophers have been in-
clined to rush in without displaying due care at those crucial points at which it is
our job as philosophers to be careful. From the very start, the “application” is, in this
context, dangerously ambiguous between a semantic theory with a certain impure
content and a purpose to which that theory is put. So a more rigorous approach is
required.
As I shall frame matters, an impure semantic theory is a version, or instance, of a
pure semantic theory that: (i) has as its object a given pre-identified subject matter;
(ii) has the form of a given pure semantic theory and (iii) involves commitment
to specific content at some (at least some) of the philosophical commitment points
identified points in the pure theory.14 Moreover, such an impure theory ought to be
associated with a purpose where the notion of purpose is two-dimensional, involving:
(iv) a certain particular range of semantic features that are intended for elucidation
and (v) a conception of the kind of elucidation intended.
On subject matter, I shall be concerned only with impure semantic theories that
are intended to be about a pre-identified modality. Various subject matters are sus-
ceptible to logical analysis in terms of QUIDO-systems and QUIDO-structures: the
propositional attitudes, temporality, games, quantum mechanics etc.15 But I shall
not be concerned with impure semantic theories whose intended subject matter is
so palpably non-modal. I cast my subject matter as modality of a pre-identified kind
in the conviction that we can recognize and name kinds of modality after reflection
on our practical concerns and (non-semantic) theoretical projects. Thus, illustrating
in the mode of possibility we have: technological possibility, nomological possibil-
ity, epistemic possibility, legal possibility, logical possibility, metaphysical possibility
etc. It is a matter to be settled further down the line, if at all, how these kinds are
precisely individuated or how they are related to each other. The relevant adjectives
and adverbs (technological, metaphysically etc.) are what are supposed to fit in the
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place marked by “X ” in various specifications of the further elements of the QUIDO
structure (X -possible worlds, X -possibilia etc.). But I shall suppress the relativizing
term, “X ” when operating within a context that allows that. Furthermore, I shall pre-
sume that we are dealing with aspects of modal subject matter that are comfortably
representable in regimentation by the dual operators of QUIDO logics: but I will not
broach here the issue of which aspects those are.
QUIDO logics become modal logics as a matter of intention and QUIDO models
become part of a possible-worlds semantic theory as a matter of their content. For
philosophical clarity, QUIDO logics should be called modal logics (when and) only
when they are deployed with the intention or purpose of representing the inferential
properties of modal expressions: expressions which our usage, or perhaps stipulation,
has already settled as being modal. Associated Kripkean semantic interpretations of
such modal logics should be called possible-worlds semantic theories only if they are
intended to represent given semantic features of the modal expressions, via appropri-
ate models, in terms of quantification over possible-worlds (and where the proponent
of the theory takes the entities in question to be deserving of the “possible-worlds”
name). Thus, we are now concerned with logics for a pre-identified modality in which
 and ◊ are dual operators, of necessity and possibility and with possible-worlds se-
mantic theories of these logics.16
4.2. Possible-Worlds Semantic Theories: Minimal Content and
Conditional Modal Results
Pure Kripke semantics becomes an impure possible-worlds semantic theory (for a
quantified logic of a given modality) with the selection of a species of QUIDO struc-
ture and the postulation of special, impure, possible-worlds models that conform
to that structure. If understanding is to advance, we must think of this postulated
possible-worldly content as involving both a minimal (shallow and horizontal) de-
velopment and also, potentially a (deep and vertical) development.
The minimal development involves a specification of the elements that amounts
only to owning the names that they have in a possible-worlds semantic theory —
committing to a conception of those names as non-arbitrary and appropriate. Thus, to
take the comprehensive case of a distinguished QUIDO model, 〈G, K , R, D,ψ(H)〉!, we
have ownership of the following vocabulary: the actualized world, (G); the set of all
the X -possible worlds, (K); the relation of relative X -possibility (aka X -accessibility),
(R); the set of all X -possibilia, (D); the set of possibilia that exist in possible-world H,
ψ(H)〉 and the intended space of possible worlds, given by 〈G, K , R, D,ψ(H)〉!. And
below this level of description we do well also to at least allow for ownership of an
“at-ness” locution of representation by a model. This is available as a locution that
potentially unifies what is represented by a world about its domain (existing at) and
what is the case there (true at).
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So, to illustrate intent, what is left open at this point is whether or not possible-
worlds are to be taken, further, as things of any of the kinds that they might (in
this context) reasonably be supposed to be — maximal sums, sets or conjunctions of
propositions, states of affairs, properties, pictures or spatiotemporally-located indi-
viduals. How exactly we proceed within that limitation is a question of deep content
to which we shall return. But what is supposed to be ruled out now, in this context
and at this stage, is that the possible worlds of the models for a modal logic might
be taken to be the drawers in my desk, the nations of the earth or anything else that
is not of that intended (maximal, worldly) ilk that we can recognize when we see
it. With that minimal specification of possible-worldly content in place we can fill
out the impure semantic picture by owning as versions of the semantic predicates
the more widely deployable: True, (T); False, (F) and Valid, (VAL). Three important
points can be introduced following these clarifications and each will subsequently be
elaborated.
Firstly, we can now substitute all relevant impure terms in the appropriate pure
definitions and claim the ensuing results. Secondly, it is no longer an open question
whether such results are really claims about the semantic features of a given modality
rather than about something else: given the facts about the subject matter intended
and the content assigned that is what they are doing. Thirdly, however, there is an
important sense in which the relevant results — which are undoubtedly theses about
the semantic features of a given modality — are still only conditionally established.
We can confidently introduce the impure semantic terms into pure definitions and
ensuing results because: (a) the results of the pure semantic theory are established
with respect to all models that are instances of given structures and, therefore, (b)
they devolve to any impure semantic theory as we understand that here, since (c)
each is but a sub-theory in which the models are a special restricted range of all of
those that are instances of the structure. Of course, if you refuse point blank to ac-
cept the existence of possible worlds then you will not accept that there are models
that contain them and so you will not accept that there are such things to be among
the totality of models. But otherwise, you have in prospect impure results about —
say — the Validity of the B schema for nomological necessity, the Completeness of
an S5-logic of metaphysical modality and the Safety of using first-order methods to
determine that the S5-schema is not a theorem of S4. With the pure results estab-
lished unconditionally, the ensuing impure results are in prospect. But wherever we
are concerned with a given pre-identified modality (nomological, metaphysical, etc.)
the results are, emphatically, in prospect only and remain conditional. The condi-
tion that pertains, and whose satisfaction remains to be established, is that the given
modality merits being modelled in the relevant species of pure structure. We return
to that all-important issue in 5 below.
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4.3. Modal Spaces and their Hyper-Spaces: Variation Across Worlds
versus Variation Across Models
It is appropriate, as a matter of minimal commitment to a possible-worlds seman-
tics for a modality, to say that each model represents a version of X -modal space
— a version of the space of metaphysically possible worlds, of the technologically
possible-worlds, etc. A possible-worlds semantic theory of a modality, then, commits
its proponent to the existence of whatever such models are required to represent an
appropriate variety of such modal spaces. We must then be vigilant in observing the
semantically crucial distinction between the familiar variation across possible worlds
within a model and this recently noted variation across modal spaces within the log-
ical hyperspace of that modality. Once we register this distinction various tempting
and casual characterizations of relevant pluralities are revealed as invitations to con-
fusion that ought to be refused.
Firstly, we are well advised to avoid using the term logical space as a blanket term
for whatever is represented by an arbitrary model, for this is doubly treacherous. For
one thing, the semantical interpretation of the logic of a modality is something that
is executed at the level of a modal hyperspace and not at the level of a modal space:
matters of logical validity are matters concerning all of the admissible models of the
totality of (say) the metaphysically possible worlds. So one would more accurately
say that the logical space for the metaphysical modality is a logical hyperspace and not
any one space of metaphysically possible worlds. For another thing, if we can neu-
tralize that first threat of confusion and wish to persevere with calling some modal
space(s) “logical”, we should do that only if it is the logical modality, identified as
such, that is the intended subject matter of the semantic theory. If it is the logical
modality, pre-identified as such, that is our subject matter, then it is appropriate to
say of the impure models we invoke that each represents a version of logically modal
space — a space of logically possible worlds. And if one is prepared to commit to
there being an intended model in that case, calling it logical space (tout court) might
be put down to harmless ellipsis — ellipsis on “the space of logically possible worlds
in the intended model”. But if you begin by presenting your intended subject mat-
ter as anything other than “logical” modality then substantial work, and explanatory
responsibility, must be undertaken in order to earn the right to apply the “logical”
epithet to the modality subsequently in the course of semantic, or metaphysical, the-
orizing. The point is most telling when we are entertaining the prospect of there
being modalities that are absolute but characterizable other than as logical. For it
should be a substantial hypothesis, and not a matter for casual presumption, that the
intended model of the metaphysically possible worlds is — even in extension — an
accurate representation of the intended space of logical possibility. It is a different
and no less substantial hypothesis that the logical hyperspace for logical modality is
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identical to the logical hyperspace for metaphysical modality. Equally, it is unjustified
to set out by helping ourselves to the “logical” epithet in this context as a synonym
for maximal or absolute. There are substantive and difficult questions about whether
any kind of alethically modal space is absolute, or even maximal, in its inclusion of
all alethic modalities — either in the intended case or otherwise. And these questions
ought not to be spoiled by the un-necessary and presumptious characterization of (de
dicto) whatever models or spaces that have these features as “logical”.17
Secondly, we are also well advised to avoid transferring casually to the semantics
of modal logic the argot surounding the semantics of non-modal logic in calling al-
ternate models representations of “different possibilities” or “different ways that an
X-modal space could be”. To show that caution, is required I offer an example of a line
of thought that has some prima facie plausibility. Take as hypotheses: (a) that nothing
is both red all over and green all over and (b) it is absolutely necessarily so. In the
case of non-modal logic, (a), and modal logic, (b), we might expect unintended mod-
els to represent the falsehood of the hypothesis in question. But in that case what is
represented in those unintended models is not properly called a possibility. For what
are truly possibilities have already been exhausted by what is represented (as true)
in the intended model and the negation of hypothesis (a) is not represented in (any
possible world in) that model. So what is represented in the worlds in the alternates
to the intended model are not invariably and obviously (other) possibilities.18 There
is however another subtle distinction to be observed here.
Even if one were entirely convinced that the alternate models in the semantics of
a modality do not invariably represent possibilities, there is something else that might
be granted. By hypothesis, then, what the unintended models do not do in such a case
is to represent something that is in fact possible. But it is a different matter whether
what is represented by (a world in) a model of a modal logic is thereby represented
as possible. This is the sense of represented that includes misrepresented as a special
case. In the case of the interpretation of non-modal logic we might easily acquiesce
in the idea that the unintended models misrepresent by representing as non-modal
fact that which often is contrary to non-modal fact. That is what the totality of such
unintended models is for: it is to represent all cases of being contrary to (non-modal)
fact that is permitted by the definition of a model for the non-modal logic. In the
case of the interpretation of modal logic, then we might equally acquiesce in the idea
that the unintended models misrepresent by representing as modal fact that which
often is contrary to modal fact. That is what the totality of such unintended models
is for: it is to represent all cases of being contrary to modal fact that is permitted
by the definition of a model for the modal logic. So the moral of the story is that
the difference between variation within and variation across modal spaces is one
that necessitates our distinguishing carefully the claim that what is represented is a
possibility from the claim that it is being represented as a possibility.
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It is noted, finally, that this distinction suggests a way of understanding Kripke’s
use of quotation in the infamous passage cited above at the outset — thus:
Intuitively, we look at matters thus: K is the set of all ‘possible worlds’; G is
the ‘real world’ and . . . (p.63)
For perhaps this is not scare quotation at all but intimation of the following idea: that
for all possible-world-models of the given structure, by having a world w as a member
of such a K the model thereby calls w a “possible world”. This is invariably represen-
tation of a world as possible and but certainly not invariably accurate representation
of a world that is possible. Representation, by a model, of a world as possible is the
analog of the more familiar notion of representation of a possible world, by itself, as
actualized: the latter is supposed to be achieved just by a possible world’s being a
possible world and in all but one case it is a feat of self-misrepresentation.
4.4. Identifying The Commitment-Drivers in Possible-Worlds Semantic
Theories
There are three points (shared by the pure models of IDO+ structures and of QUIDO+
structures) at which impure ideological or conceptual commitments for a possible-
worlds semantic theory are foreshadowed. The points are: (i) the AT, or representa-
tion, feature found with claims that something exists at or is the case at a possible
world (in a model); (ii) the distinguishing feature, within a model, of a world as actu-
alized and (iii) the distinguishing, within the space of models, of a model as intended.
Any possible-world semantic theory that incorporates models at any level of struc-
ture requires commitments involving some version of the AT feature. If such a theory
is concerned only with Validity and not with Truth its distinctive non-ontological
commitments end there. Any possible-world semantic theory that is concerned with
Truth simpliciter requires, in addition, commitments involving the intendedness fea-
ture and the actualization feature. We have seen that the pure theory distilled from
Kripke (1963) is of the former kind: accordingly, its impure instances are limited in
respect of non-ontological commitment to an AT feature (or features) alone. To antic-
ipate deep matters, momentarily, in the cause of illustration, ATness might be taken
as: homogeneous or heterogeneous over exists AT and true AT; it might in either case
be taken as primitive, or as (in some sense) theorizable in terms of set-membership,
or part-hood or some sort of consequence relation.
It is, to say the least, a rather important feature of the Kripke (1963) theory that
its range — and taking the author at his word — is limited to the semantic aspect of
the logical concept of validity. Granted, it is not easy to see why we would have any
philosophical interest in the notion of Validity other than in virtue of its connections
to Truth. But a semantic theory of Validity for a modality which, for its philosophical
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significance, presupposes Truth (à la Kripke (1963)) is quite a different animal from
a semantic theory that seeks to encompass within its range an elucidation of Truth.
The starting point for the identification of drivers of ontological commitments in
possible-worlds semantic theories is, of course, consideration of the case of commit-
ment to the existence of possible worlds. In that case, our Archimedean point is as
follows. Any possible-world semantic theory that incorporates models at any level of
structure requires commitment to the existence of at least one possible world.19 And
when we are concerned with the territory of quantified modal logics there is also
commitment to the existence of the possibilia individuals that exist in that world at
least. However, it is strictly consistent with the minimal characterization of a possible-
worlds semantic theory that it should be ontologically committed only to one, actual-
ized, possible world and only to the actualized possibilia that exist at it.20 Ontological
commitments to non-actualized possible worlds and to non-actualized possible indi-
viduals are driven by certain specific commitments about the extent of modal truth:
specifically, by (certain) denials of necessity. It is to such negative claims that the the-
ory assigns truth-conditions that have the logical form of existential quantifications.
For positive claims of necessity have the logical form of, non-existentially-committing,
universal generalizations. What follows is a swift characterization of the necessities
whose denial is effective in the respective cases.
Firstly, in a one-world model we will have, in all relevant structures, modal truths
but also modal collapse. Whatever is true at the actualized world is, of course, thereby
true at some world and thus we have truths of possibility. But in a one-world model,
whatever is true at the actualized world is also thereby true at every world and thus
we have truths of necessity.21 That also settles that there will be truths of impossibil-
ity — as long as it is not the case that absolutely everything is true at the actualized
world. For what is false at the actualized world, in such a model, is thereby false at all
possible worlds and, thus, an impossibility. It is a requirement of there being modal
truths of non-necessity in a model — that is, truths of contingency or of possibility-
not — that it is a many-world model. For given that P is true in the actualized world,
possibly-not-P will also be true at that world only if there is an accessible world
at which not-P. Under the supposition that that P is true in the actualized world
(and with ongoing classical restrictions) the actualized world itself cannot be such a
world. And so, the truth of possibly-not-P requires the truth of another world and,
given that there is but one actualized world, that other world will be a non-actualized
world. All of that concerns what goes on in a model — an arbitrary model — and
raises the question of whether a world that is non-actualized in a model is a world
that is non-actualized simpliciter. The answer to that question, on all pertinent and
reasonable presumptions must be negative. For in a perfectly legitimate contrary-to-
modal-fact representation in a unintended model, a world other than the (really)
actualized world would be represented as the actualized world of the model. So, fi-
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nally and with the intended level of precision, the precise source of commitment to
non-actualized possible worlds in commitment to there being at least some modal
truths (simpliciter) of the form possibly not-P. For it is these truths (simpliciter) that
require the existence in the intended model of possible worlds that are represented as
non-actualized: and it is those worlds that really are the non-actualized worlds tout
court. For convenience, I shall refer to this precise source of commitment to the exis-
tence of non-actualized worlds somewhat less precisely as commitment to contingent
truth (or to contingency).22
Secondly, as is familiar, the question of the existence of possibilia (other than
possible worlds) arises only with quantified modal logics via their QUIDO structures
and the element D. Consider, then a QUIDO model in which — cutting to the case
we know to be crucial — the intended model is such that it contains only the one,
actualized, possible world and the domain of possibilia that exist at it. Without meta-
physical prejudice we label these the actualized possibilia. It will be true in such a
model that necessarily each of these exists and necessarily that all of these exist. For
in this model all (actualized) individuals exist at every possible world. Expansion of
such a model with respect to the number of worlds will have no impact on which
modalized existence claims are true unless we have variation in domains across those
worlds. As long as there is constancy of domain, changes in extension of many other
predicates will occur as we move from world to world (the representatives of x is
blue, x is taller than y . . . ). But the extension of the predicate (that represents) y
being such that x is identical to it will remain identical to D, and to d ′(w∗). Thus
each and every actualized individual (indeed each and every possible individual in
the model) will exist at every possible world. Taking the hint from the earlier case of
propositional modal logic, we seek the generator of non-actualized possible individ-
uals in the realm of contingency. But in this case, not just any relevant contingency
will do. What we need is the contingency born of upward domain variation: not that
born of downward domain variation. The semantic conditions of truth (simpliciter)
of a claim that some x that exists might not have done are these: there should be a
non-actualized world at which x does not exist and that, clearly, is not a require-
ment of the existence of any possible individual. The semantic conditions of truth
(simpliciter) of a claim that some x might have existed but does not are these: there
should be a world at which there exists some y and that y is not identical to any
x that exists in the actualized world. That requires that the y in question is not in
the domain of the actualized world and that is to say it is a possible individual that
is not an actualized individual which is to say — finally — a non-actualized possi-
ble individual. For convenience, I shall refer to this precise driver of commitment to
the existence of non-actualized possibilia as commitment to truths of possible extra
existence.23,24 I do not — of course — claim that those commitments to contingency
that drive commitment to the non-actualized entities is, in either, case inescapable.
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One could choose to avoid commitments to non-actualized possible worlds by declin-
ing to commit to any contingent truth and one could choose to avoid commitments
to non-actualized possible worlds by declining to commit to truths of possible extra
existence.25
Thirdly, there is the subtle, difficult and neglected question of whether commit-
ment to impossible worlds is driven by the proponent of a Kripkean possible-worlds
semantics for modal logics who has orthodox commitments about the extent of Va-
lidities. The point here is not one about the driving of a commitment to the existence
of impossibilia by any commitment in the realm of modal truth.26 It is a point about
the logical hyperspace of the modality rather than about the intended modal space.
The suspicion of such a commitment to the existence of impossible worlds is rooted
in an intuition about what models (ought to) do.
The relevant intuition about the unintended models for a logic is that their point
is to represent variation in non-logical fact. In the case of modal logics, then, the point
of unintended models would be to represent as possible, inter alia, what is contrary
to modal fact (but not contrary to modal-logical fact). And that, indeed, suggests that
there should be impossible worlds in unintended models — as long as one is in the
market for a modality that is absolute but (in some relevant sense) inequivalent to
the strictly logical modality. So what might thus be envisaged as being represented
as true in the worlds of unintended models would be analytic impossibilities, such
as something’s being both red all over and green all over, or metaphysical impossi-
bilities such as something’s having water in it but no Hydrogen. But whatever else
is going on here, it will be noted that the picture appears to require constancy of
meaning of non-logical predicates across models and so across the variations that
changes of model permits. For say that the intended model represents the modal fact
of the necessity of water containing Hydrogen by a certain formula being true at ev-
ery possible world in the model: ∀x(W x ⊃ H x). Then if it is the case that another
model represents, contrary to modal fact, that it is not necessary that water contains
hydrogen, and it does so by containing a world at which that formula is false, then
that requires that the formula in question means what it meant before in the other
model. For only then can we presume that the modal fact represented as holding in
one model is the very modal fact that is represented as failing to hold in the other. It
is not obvious that this picture is coherent. But if it is coherent it appears to impose
an interesting and significant limitation on the power of the possible-world semantic
theory. For if meaning is something that can persist across models it cannot be some-
thing that is even co-ordinate with any situation that obtains within any one model.
The semantic theory of Kripke (1963), of course, expresses no aspiration to take the
semantic feature of meaning within its scope. But the point is worth noting for the
benefit of those who would so extend it.
Another intuition about models, however, begins with the opposite thought to
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that which emerges from the first. This intuition about the models (for modal log-
ics) is that their point is to represent meaning-variation: to display all the variations
of meanings of expressions that the value-assignments of the model theory permits.
We might add, although this is not strictly an essential part of the thought, that the
model theory for the logic is fixing the meaning of what it treats as the logical ex-
pressions (in this case, expressions including the modal operators) while displaying
all the variations of meanings of the non-logical expressions. In any case, what we
lose on this view is the idea that what unintended models are doing is representing
as possible a content (or a fact) that the intended model represents as impossible.
What the unintended models are doing, more like, is representing variations in the
interpretation of interpretable expressions that are consistent with the trans-model
interpretation of the logical constants. What the evaluation of the model theory does
is to fix the truth-value-relevant behaviour of the logical constants at every world in
every model. And to investigate the consequences of this, and this alone, for validity
of formulas containing these expressions it allows the meanings of all other expres-
sions to vary from model to model. In that case, if the intended model represents
the necessity of water containing Hydrogen by having the formula, ∀x(W x ⊃ H x),
true at every possible world in the model, it cannot be read off from the falsehood
of the same formula in a world in another model that what is represented is the
non-necessity of water containing Hydrogen. So there is no commitment afoot in the
latter representation to anything that deserves to be called an impossible world: for
that would be a world one at which what is true is a content representing that which
is contrary to modal fact.
However, having registered and developed these intuitions about the role of mod-
els, the effective question is that of the variation across models which is required by
the semantic theory at hand. And, I shall argue, those requirements align with the
second intuition in not generating commitment to impossible worlds out of natural
commitments about the extent of validity.27
In this matter, it is the understanding of the syntax of the semantic theory itself,
rather than that of its object-language, that is crucial.
The kind of formula that is properly called Valid is an axiom scheme and is a
formula of a semantic meta-language. Take, then, the case of the scheme:
S4. A⊃ A
Here, Kripke calls ‘A’ a propositional variable and that gets the point across that
the schema is not a thing that is true or false but at most a thing that has true or false
instances. The true and false instances of formulas involving ‘A’ are closed sentences
of the object-language. But just as no such meta-language schema is properly called
True, no object-language sentence is properly called Valid. Now, take as a hypothesis
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that the following sentence of English, with its usual meaning, expresses an (abso-
lutely) necessary truth: “ All water molecules contain Hydrogen”. So the following is
true: “ It is necessary that all water molecules contain Hydrogen”. And, with meaning
preserved, let us represent that former sentence in our object-language in the nota-
tion of propositional modal logic alone and then in the notation of quantified modal
logic as follows:
(1) P
(2) ∀x(W x ⊃ H x)
In both cases we have truth-evaluable sentences at the level of the object-lan-
guage. The legitimate connection that these sentences have to the meta-linguistic
concept of Validity is via the following question. Does either sentence display a sche-
matic form that is Valid? That is to ask if either of the following schemes of the meta-
language is valid:
(1*) A
(2*) ∀x(ϑx ⊃ Πx)
And, of course, neither scheme is Valid, given that box, as is now fixed, is an op-
erator of alethic necessity. For that would be to say that every closed sentence of the
relevant form would be true in every model and thereby in the intended model. And
thereby we would have either, (1*) the necessary truth of every closed sentence —
and hence a reduction, in the case of any A and Not-A — or, not much better, (2*) of at
least every universal generalization. So we are bound to accept such orthodox com-
mitments to Invalidity and to postulate appropriate worlds. But the counter-worlds
in question need be only worlds at which some instance of the relevant schema is
false. For recall, the only candidate around for being true or false is such a schema
instance. Accordingly, all that is required to invalidate the schema is the falsehood in
a model and a possible world of a (truth-evaluable, object language) sentence that
shares a form (1*) with (1) or the form (2*) with (2). And that, of course is NOT to
require the falsehood in a model and a possible world of (1*) or (2*) nor of the (ex
hypothesi) necessary truths P or ∀x(W x ⊃ H x). In other words to distance claims of
necessity from claims of validity in a modal logic we need not even go near sentences
that have the same non-modal content (for example, about water and about hydro-
gen) as those that in fact express the necessities in question. We need only consider
closed sentences that have the same modal-logical form and, moreover, to find the
right sentences we may not even have to look beyond the intended model. Thus, I
conclude that orthodox commitments about Invalidity have not been shown to im-
pose on the proponent of our possible-world semantic theory a commitment to the
existence of impossible worlds.
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4.5. The What and The Why of Non-Minimal Content
Non-minimal, or deep, content is added to a minimally impure possible-worlds se-
mantic theory by an increase in philosophical commitments about the entities and
concepts involved. Primarily, deep content is a matter of metaphysical or conceptual
elaboration — for example: a metaphysical account of the kind of thing that a pos-
sible world is; a conceptual or ideological account of the predicates of accessibility
or actualization or a characterization of the domain over which the quantifiers of the
theory range. Such an account may be offered is the spirit of reductionism: that is by
offering an informative definition, analysis, re-description or identification. Such an
account may, equally, be offered is the spirit of primitivism: that is by asserting unde-
finability, unanalysability or insusceptibility to theoretically significant re-description
or identification. No doubt, further and more sophisticated theoretical attitudes are
available. But for present purposes I shall take just these two kinds of non-quietist,
non-neutral, non-agnostic and positive theoretical stances, on each relevant question,
to be exhaustive.
The vast majority of philosophical discussion around possible worlds has been
taken up with such issues of deep content. Should we best think of the possible worlds
as (maximal) sums of spatiotemporally located individuals, as propositions, as states
of affairs, as properties or as sets of any of the above? Should we take the terms
“possible world” and “actualization” as semantic primitives or as definable? Should
we distinguish, ideologically, the actual from the actualized? If so, should we take the
non-actualized possibilia to be identical to things that actually exist, and in which we
already believe, or is our commitment to them to be viewed as a warranted expansion
of ontology? I have pursued these questions extensively elsewhere (Divers 2002) and
my aim here is not to re-open them. Rather it is to make a methodological point
about the appropriate approach to such questions following reflection on an impure
Kripkean possible-worlds semantic theory for quantified modal logics.
My methodological contention is that taking a position on deep content is sen-
sible only if it is well motivated, and that is to say purpose-driven. The pre-eminent
rationale for a deep content proposal should conform to the following pattern. Given
that one takes the purpose(s) of the semantic theory to be this (these), one’s op-
tions for thinking about the concepts and entities involved are those, and among
these options, theoretical considerations give such reason as we have for thinking
about the concepts and entities involved in this way rather than in that way. This
much is rational. But it is not obviously rational to insist in advance of requirements
of purpose that possible worlds must be abstract entities, or must be characterizable
adequately only via the involvement of primitively modal concepts etc.28 In any case,
as I understand it, the project of developing a possible-worlds semantic theory, from
the minimal stage is to take a position on content that will support adequately the
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identification of an intended range of models of modal space for a given modality
and for given purposes. Indeed, it is tempting to treat as pseudo-questions those of
what possible worlds or possibilia really are, unless there is a context of purpose onto
which we can project the question as one about best fit to a theoretical role.
4.6. Purpose: Semantic Range and Elucidation Type
The conception of purpose that we need is two-dimensional: one dimension is that
of semantic range, the other is that of the type of elucidation intended of what lies
in that range.
The dimension of semantic range can, in the present context, extend maximally
over a theory of truth, a theory of validity and a metalogic. Here, a metalogic is just
a facility to define and address the extension of the already encountered, and validity-
dependent, concepts of soundness, completeness, safety and optimality. Kripke
(1963) offers a semantic theory whose range is a theory of validity and a metalogic.
To repeat an important point, that the interest of such a theory should in some sense
presuppose truth is granted but that is not the same as the theory encompassing truth
within the range of semantic concepts that ait aims to elucidate. In any case, to cover
all relevant ground, I shall continue to consider a Kripkean semantic theory that is of
maximal relevant range and so encompasses a theory of truth within its range.
The dimension of elucidation type covers the various kinds of improvement of
perspective on modal truth and validity that we might think that we acquire as a
result of the theory. For present purposes, I shall distinguish five prima facie types of
elucidation.
The first and least ambitious level of claim that might be made is that the elucida-
tion afforded is (merely) heuristic. This is the name that I choose for a category that
is needed in order to file all versions of the following idea. That what we are given
by Kripke’s (half-hearted) suggestions about how we may think of the elements (as
possible worlds etc.) is a way of thinking and speaking that is attractive, but not in
itself of any logical or philosophical cash value. It is, all will agree, in many ways
easy and natural for us to imagine, think of and speak of a space of objects (cf Quine
1969). And when we speak of possible worlds as forming a modal space (as they do in
each model) iterated modal expressions, in particular, become tractable in away that
they would not be otherwise. Indeed, when attempting to come to terms with, say,
the impossibility of contingent necessity say, it is all but irresistible to think terms
of a space of worlds, and a journey around it, once we are aware of that option.
However, the heuristic thought goes, if we do gain any serious insight by indulging
in the idiom it is collateral and indirect: it is like doing so by way of getting a joke,
or a bump on the head or grasping a metaphor (cf Davidson 1978). It might even
be argued that such heuristic elucidation is a pervasive, critical and essential part of
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our beginning to theorize any subject matter (cf Quine 1980). So heuristic need not
carry the suggestion of intellectual insignificance or triviality. There may well be de-
ferred philosophical value in the heuristic since it may suggest to us how to go about,
or how not to go about, those projects in which the achievement of philosophical
benefit immediately and directly is the point. But in pleading (mere) heuristic, one
unloads both immediate costs and immediate benefits. We have no obligation to give
any deep account of what we are saying, but nor are we entitled simply to repeat
what we are saying — even if so little is demanded of us than to tell literal truths
about the semantic features of the modal idioms.
The second level of claim that might be made for the elucidatory capacity of the
theory is that it is, or yields, a useful instrument. The defining idea here is that the pri-
mary philosophical value of the theory lies with its providing techniques or methods
that we are entitled to use in order to reach conclusions about validity: about which
modal conclusions do and which do not, follow from which modal premises. So the
instrumental conception of the theory is validity-focused and we put aside whether
it allows us any facility will modal truth as a by-product. The central instrumental-
ist value in prospect is that (appeal to) possible-worlds semantic theory allows us
to do modal logic by proxy through only first-order methods. The glaring challenge
that any such instrumentalist must confront is to say something about why the first-
order methods are reliable. And then a dilemma looms. On one hand, the would-be
instrumentalist might then be drawn into making deeper claims about the impure
semantics, in which case she is no longer just an instrumentalist about the impure
theory. On the other hand, the would-be instrumentalist might point out the follow-
ing truth: the completeness of various logics, as guaranteed by the pure semantics,
is available to her as a guarantor of the safety of the first-order methods. But in that
case, we need have here nothing that requires the play with impure semantic theory.
What we may have is no more than the combination of a user-friendly idiom whose
philosophical cash value does not derive from its content, even minimally construed.
This dilemma fuels the suspicion that that such instrumentalism about a genuinely
impure possible-worlds semantic theory of validity may be an untenable position that
is set to collapse under minimal scrutiny.
The third level of claim that might be made for the elucidatory capacity of the
theory is that it is, in at lest some aspects, a literally accurate representation of the
semantic facts about the relevant modal expressions and the sentences in which they
figure. I shall take this as a conception of the theory as one that tells the (literal)
truth about semantic features of modal expressions.29 However the truth, although
perfectly literal, may yet be qualified. When we pay attention to the theory we may
find that some of the truths that it affords are conditional statements or truths that
rely for their truth on the presence of some crucial relativizing, index. But, for all
that, the claim is that there is literal truth to be had. My principle claim about the
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hierarchy of elucidatory ambition is that it is here, with commitment to literal truth,
that metaphysical and conceptual responsibilities ensue and questions of deep con-
tent kick in. At any lower level of ambition what is being claimed does not demand a
position on deep content: but commitment to this type of elucidation does. Now that
we have truth: what is primitive, what is not and how so?30
The penultimate level of claim in the hierarchy of elucidatory ambition is that the
impure semantic theory is true and semantically explanatory. Thus, the explanations
discerned will be of those semantic facts about validity for modal inferences and
perhaps truth for modal sentences that the theory is explicitly equipped to generate
and display.
The ultimate level of claim, then, is that the impure possible-worlds semantic
theory is (true and) supra-semantically explanatory. Various philosophical concep-
tions of how we should go about the theory of meaning, or metaphysics or (per-
haps even) epistemology, will encompass a conception of truth-values and, especially,
truth-conditions for relevant sentences: truth-conditions that are generated in a cer-
tain way or specified in a certain form. The prospect then arises that our possible-
world semantic theory treats the truth-conditions of modal sentences in a way that
the proponents of these conceptions will recognize, or at least allow, as philosophi-
cally propitious for their supra-semantic purposes. Ultimately, then, a possible-worlds
semantic theory, may be held to contribute to such explanations as those of the nature
of possibility (and necessity), the meaning of modal sentences or the source of modal
knowledge. Arrival at this ultimate level of claim of supra-semantically explanatory
power for the semantic theory calls for an interlude.
4.7. Truth-Roles in a Semantical Theory of Logics, and Beyond
The Kripkean semantics for quantified modal logics in its pure state already allows
us to make an important structural connection between sentences and inferences.
We can see that whenever a complex sentence of a certain form is Val there is a
corresponding inference that is T-preserving for every degree of relativization of T:
T-in-a-K-member-in a model; T-in-a model and T-simpliciter. A class of correspond-
ing impure (and partial) semantic theories is introduced via uniform substitution of
‘T’ occurrences by a predicate of truth (and of ‘F’ by a predicate of falsehood). On
one way of looking at the matter, we then have here, a Truth-role that is defined in
terms of other semantic concepts. In the first part, the definition is explicit since Truth
is defined as Truth-at-the-actualized-world-in-the-intended-model. But the definition
of the un-relativized Truth-role bottoms out in an implicit definition of the primitive
and relativized Truth-role: one which ensures that the un-relativized Truth-role can
be played by any property that is distributed and preserved over sentences as the
evaluation rules of the semantics require. In sum, what we get from the impure se-
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mantics is a partial definition of a non-relativized truth-predicate, Θ1, in terms of the
impure and relativized truth-predicate, Θ3 and (what are identified as) the logical
constants of the language (∧, . . . ,):
(TΘ) Θ1 is the feature such that: (i) Θ1(A) iff Θ3(A, actualized world, intended
model) where (ii) Θ3(A) is the feature that is distributed and preserved thus:
Θ3(B ∧ C , H, M) iff Θ3(B, H, M) and Θ3(C , H, M) . . . and . . . Θ3(B, H, M)
iff for all H∗ accessible from H, Θ3(B, H∗, M).
However — and rightly or wrongly — potential interest in the impure semantics
of quantified modal logics greatly outstrips our interest in logic alone. For the seman-
tics: (a) circumscribes a truth-role that applies to modal sentences and thereby (b)
promises to illuminate modality via connections between that truth-role and other
truth-roles that are partially (and in the first instance, very loosely) defined in terms
of high-level theoretical commitments in the theory of meaning, in metaphysics and
in epistemology — thus:
(TΨ) The meaning of a sentence, S, is given by its Ψ–conditions.
(TΦ) The ontological commitments associated with asserting a sentence S are to
those things that make that sentence Φ.
(TΩ) A belief that S is knowledge that S when S is warranted and S is Ω.31
In real cases, we should expect to see expressions of finer-grained commitments
with correspondingly finer-grained roles specified in further terms from the given
source of interest — for example, in the case of meaning:
(TΨ∗) The meaning of a sentence, S, is given when its Ψ–conditions are presented
in a certain way ∧ To understand a sentence is to know what its Ψ–conditions
(so presented) are.
And any such refinement of grain only serves to sharpen the obvious challenge
to any proponent of the semantic theory. That is to take a position on: (a) what
kind of supra-semantic significance, if any, the impure Kripkean metalogical theory
of validity for quantified modal logic is supposed to have and (b) the basis on which
any such connection is claimed (working hypothesis, argument, etc.). The maximal
position in the former respect would be that there is (at least) one alethic property
that unifies all of the conceptually disparate truth-roles by being relatable to each
in appropriate ways. And a multitude of intermediate combinations are available
for consideration. Perhaps it will be held that some/any alethic property that is apt
to play the validity role is also apt to play the meaning-role, but not to play the
metaphysical-role. But then philosophical satisfaction demands that we are also given
a story about the grounds or basis on which such a position is being taken. Were there
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no such connections to be made or at least worthy of exploration, it is difficult to see
why there would be any interest in an impure version of the meta-logical theory of
validity. However, I note that there is no claim of supra-semantic significance made for
the semantic theory in Kripke (1963). Indeed, it would be of significance to establish
any source at all in which a connection between the possible-worlds semantics for
quantified modal logics and any supra-semantic concerns is supported by anything
more substantial than tacit presumption. Having made the point, I shall be concerned
now only with the consequences of hypotheses of connections between the semantic
and the supra-semantic: not the grounds on which they are claimed.
4.8. Co-Ordination Obligations
The primary obligations of the philosopher who deals in Kripkean possible-worlds
semantics are: (a) to make clear the envisaged purposes of the theory (range and
elucidation-type intended) and (b) to co-ordinate commitments of minimal and non-
minimal content to those purposes. Such co-ordination requires respecting at every
turn the questions of whether given resources, that are clearly identified, are suffi-
cient or, especially, required for those purposes.
Take a philosopher who accepts (at least) that a possible-worlds semantic the-
ory for quantified modal logics genuinely represents facts (literal truths) about the
semantic features of X -modal expressions. In particular, the range of concern ex-
tends to truth and so the commitment is that the theory genuinely represents the
facts about truth — simpliciter — conditions for X -modal sentences. This establishes
properly purpose. We assume further that our philosopher has minimal orthodox
views about the extent of X -contingent truth and X -possible extra existence (i.e. that
neither category is empty). Following the discussion of minimal commitments and
their sources, we know that such a philosopher is — at least pro tem — committed to
the existence of: non-actualized possible worlds and non-actualized world possible
individuals. What such a philosopher can or must say at the level of deep content is
constrained by what further theoretical ambitions are afoot.
Here is a first example. If the semantic theory is intended as offering a theory
of meaning and in a way that incorporates a meaning-reductive analysis of modal
terms, that requires that it should present an account of truth-conditions for modal
statements in non-modal terms. Accordingly, the ontology (and more) that is thus far
presented in the key modal theoretical terms “possible-world”, “possible individual”,
“relative possibility”, etc. must be shown to be presentable in non-modal terms. It
is not an option, given the stated further purpose. to take the modal terms of the
semantic theory as semantically unanalysed primitives. Approaching from the other
side, if the project (never mind why) begins with the insistence that the key modal
theoretical terms retain their initial status as primitives (that are not eliminable by
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explicit definition) then co-ordination requires abandonment of the project of pro-
viding a meaning-reductive analysis.
Here is a second example. On one conception of a theory of understanding we
have to credit competent speakers of a language with having an internally repre-
sentation (even implicit knowledge) of an appropriate compositional semantics that
attributes truth-conditions, in a certain way, to the sentences of the language. Now,
among the many obstacles that lie in front of that conception is the objection that
it cannot appropriate a semantic theory of the sort that defines truth as truth in the
intended model. Accordingly, she who would endorse the Kripkean semantic theory
we have described as one that tells the truth about truth for modal sentences has a
co-ordination problem. Naturally, such a theorist might simply abandon or have no
interest in the proposition that her semantic theory can serve a theory of understand-
ing. That would be a co-ordination success. But if serving a theory of understanding
is maintained as a prospective supra-semantic role, co-ordination must be achieved
otherwise.
Here is a third example. If the semantic theory is intended as explaining, or per-
haps even only as accurately displaying that, metaphysically, in virtue of which true
modal sentences are true then it must take at least many of its key prima facie meta-
physical commitments as primitive. For example, and putting aside whether it is a
very promising project, if the idea is to back the theory as displaying that truths of
possibility are true in virtue of the existence of possible worlds and/or possible indi-
viduals, then there can be no question — given the character of such an explanation
— of taking back or weaselling away the commitment to the existence of the pos-
sibilia. The possibilia might subsequently be characterized or identified in further
terms but that is a different matter to their existence being disavowed. This latter
point has an important generalization that is worth making explicit.
4.9. Co-Ordination Obligations and Deflationary Re-Interpretation of
the Theory
It is suggested that we can, by a certain method, have “the benefits” associated with
deploying a possible-worlds semantic theory without paying the ontological cost in
commitment to non-actualized possible worlds or possibilia. The underlying method
is that of offering a re-interpreting translation of the theory in a new medium from
which the prima facie ontological commitments are absent. Moreover, in the most
prominent cases, the effective device in the new medium is usually supposed to be
a non-factive operator, inside whose scope existential quantifiers are freed of the
ontological burden that they carry when unprotected. Thus, we have, in prospect,
fictional-prefix re-interpretations of the possible-worlds semantic theory: for prefix
fictionalism see Rosen (1990). And we also have, explicitly, various modal-operator
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re-interpretations of the possible-worlds semantic theory: for such modalism see Prior
& Fine (1978), especially Fine (1978), and Forbes (1985, 1989). For the proponents
of such re-interpretation projects, the recognition of obligations to co-ordinate pur-
pose with deep content will bring serious challenges from many sources, including
the following observations.
Firstly, and quite generally, what we need to see in support of such projects are:
(a) clear and definite conceptions of purpose and (b) reasons for believing that those
purposes can be served — unamended — under the proposed re-interpretation. In
the absence of those supporting elements, it is of no use to claim that we can have
“the benefits” without the ontological costs. For what we have, at most, then, is a
defence of the second conjunct by pointing to the non-factivity of an operator. And
that alone, without a defence of the first conjunct, cuts no ice.32 Secondly, it simply
is not the case that all of the elucidatory ambitions associated with the deployment
of a possible-worlds semantic theory will survive the discharging of ontological com-
mitments. We have already seen counterexample, with the hypothesis of possibilia as
truth-makers for possibility claims, and others are around the corner.33 Thirdly, the
very idea of constructing a theory for impure semantic purposes, in particular, and
then re-interpreting it must surely start off under suspicion of incoherence. What is
the literal truth about the semantic properties of modal expressions I am supposed to
grasp by looking at the sentences of a theory that turn out to mean something other
than what they appear to mean? The theory appears to say that the conditions under
which claims of contingency are true involve the existence of non-actualized possible
worlds. But it cannot be that truth I am grasping for, it turns out on re-interpretation,
that the theory does not say that at all. Indeed, it cannot be saying that under re-
interpretation for if it were we would not have re-interpretation at all, deflationary
or otherwise.
Finally in this regard, let us re-assert the kind of semantic theory and the kind of
elucidation that puts commitment to possible worlds and possibillia in prospect. In
the negative, if we are taking the possible worlds semantic theory as a pure theory or
if we are taking it as impure but only of heuristic value then such commitment is not
in prospect. In those cases, we also have to co-ordinate accordingly what purposes
might be served. But what is not required is deflationary re-interpretation for the
theories, so understood, are not inflated (in the relevant sense) in the first place. The
re-interpretation project is well motivated and apposite only if we have a possible-
worlds semantic theory taken impurely and which is supposed to achieve the accurate
and literal representation of something or other. But when one re-interprets the sen-
tences in which such a theory is couched, to the suggested deflationary effect, it is
no longer an impure possible-worlds semantic theory. So, in sum, it is hard to resist
the idea that little of these re-interpretation projects will survive the scrutiny that is
born of the elementary requirement to co-ordinate purpose with deep content.34
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5. The Normativity of Applicability and Logic-Selection
5.1. The Appropriateness of a Model Structure for a Modality
The applicability of a particular pure semantic theory to the subject matter of a given
modality essentially involves the association of that subject matter with a certain
species of model structure. Since the selection of a structure determines which sys-
tems are sound and/or complete it is natural to say that the application of an impure
semantic theory necessarily involves the attribution of a given logic as the logic of that
modality. The subject of this final section is the normative conditions of applicability
to a modal subject matter and (consequently) of logic-selection.
It is within a pure semantic theory that metalogical concepts are defined, and
that results about their extensions established. The results in question offer, at least,
benefits to our inferential practices. For example, Completeness lets us know that we
need no further rules (all validites are already at our disposal in the preferred proof
theory), it guarantees the safety of the practice of carrying out our modal business
in the medium of first-order logic when is suits us to do so, and it allows us to show
what cannot be derived from given rules. The availability of such enhancements to
our modal reasoning marks an advance. How significant an advance is debatable.
But, in any event, its availability is conditional. For what remains to be established in
order that, all or any of, the semantic machinery should properly be at our disposal in
modal reasoning in a given case is that we have identified an appropriate semantic
structure — one that is eligible to model the particular subject matter in question.
This is a good time at which to remind ourselves that definitions of Val-concepts that
we find in the pure semantics of Kripke (1963) are all relativized to a given kind of
model structure (M, B, S4 or S5) and that this relativity transmits to the concepts of
Soundness and Completeness. The resources are there to define a concept of ULTRA-
Validity that would put no restrictions on the structure of models but it is telling that
no philosophical reason has emerged to criticize Kripke for having passed on that
option. The resources are there also to define Validity (completeness and soundness)
simpliciter for a given modality X according to a (now) familiar pattern of appealing
to a distinguished case:
For Modality X , Val∗(A) iff A is @-Val and @ is the right structure for X
But I cannot see how our philosophical interest could survive the removal of the
residual relativization of rightness of a structure for a given modality. So it is all about
which structure is right for a given modality. This is a normative matter: the structure
that we identify for our (impure) semantic theory has to be appropriate for the given
modality and we have to have something to say about our entitlement or justification
in treating it as such. But how are we to address it?
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The customary non-method is one of occasional ad hoc observations in a method-
ological vacuum, and my aim is to improve on this position. My aim is not so ambi-
tious as to establish that a given modal logic is in any case the right one: nor even to
establish a protocol for selecting the right modal logic in general. More modestly, I
hope to set out and order the considerations from which a reflective and systematic
approach to these matters might be developed.
5.2. Some Basic Propositions of Methodology
The first item of methodological business is to embed awareness that we should not
expect — or at least we are not entitled to presume — that just any considerations of
modal truth will have a proper role in the selection of a validity-determining struc-
ture. Once we are in the business of subject matter-specific logics — modal logics,
temporal logics, epistemic logics — the default expectation must be that there are
generalizations about these subject matters that merit representation as true in the
intended model but not, thereby, in all models. I shall not attempt to argue here that
there are such cases in for any given modal subject matter — either in general or by
example. Moreover, it may be that there is something about at least certain modal
subject matters that allow us to argue, a priori, that they are not typical in this re-
spect and that they afford no such cases. But once we are aware of the spectre of
highly general but logically insignificant truths, the matter deserves attention and
proper consideration before appeal to an arbitrary general truth of modality can be
admitted as holding sway in the selection, via structures throughout a hyperspace of
models, of a logic of modality.
If we are looking to compile an inventory of all the pre-semantic-theoretical fea-
tures of a modality that might be relevant to the selection of a structure as eligible,
and to weight them appropriately, the second item of methodological business is to
register (a spectrum of) relevantly different kinds of practice in which our various
modalizings are rooted. Some modalities are given to us in ordinary usage: typically
idioms of practical modality of what can or can’t be so or be done in a conversation-
ally circumscribed context. Other modalities are given to us by technical, specialist or
perhaps even scientific — but still non-philosophical — practice: typically the can’s
and cannot’s of technology, of biology, of physics or even mathematics or logic. Then
yet other modalities are given to us by philosophy itself, and not just the kind of phi-
losophy that involves discerning or explicating what we find in ordinary or specialist
philosophical practice: thus, for example, analytic possibility and metaphysical possi-
bility. It might be that these different cases call for different weightings of potentially
relevant considerations.
The third methodological proposition is that the case for modeling a particular
modality in a particular structure cannot be made with reference only to pure terms.
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Certainly, the pure semantics and the proof-theory will allow us to establish the lo-
cations at which certain qualities are optimal and are likely, for that reason, to prove
the most desirable in relevant respects. Thus we can identify the systems that are
proof-theoretically strongest (S5), or weakest (M), and those structures that are se-
mantically least demanding on accessibility (REF) or most demanding (EQUIV) and
— as earlier noted — we can then define and locate variously maximal or optimal
inter-categorical combinations of these features. Nor, of course, is it out of the ques-
tion that we could reverse-engineer a conception of a modality as just that modality
that is salient in this or that logical respect. But no such considerations are suffi-
cient for our stated purpose. For one thing, it is perfectly reasonable to ask for an
account of why maximizing in some such respect is (optimally) desirable if it is to
be presented as such. Moreover, and crucially, it is essential that an entitlement be
established to adopt whatever logical package is supposed to be most desirable in
the case of a specific modal subject matter. A pure study can tell us that the pack-
age that gives the strongest proof theory and the simplest structure of accessibility
in extension is S5. But if that is the optimally desirable feature, we need to have a
discriminating justification for deploying it as the logic of some modalities but not
others. For, presumably, there is no question of a blanket justification for deploying
the strongest logic of alethic modality in all cases just because it is the strongest.
The justification for selecting a modal logic for a given modal subject- must always
involve appeal to considerations about that subject matter that relate it to indepen-
dently desirable features of the logic.
5.3. The Consequences for Modal Logic of Adequately Identifying
a Subject matter for Application
One candidate for having modal-logic-selecting significance is the battery of con-
straints that is exerted by standards of competent usage. If argument is wanted here
it would best proceed by establishing a link to the methodological requirement that
a prospective impure semantic theory needs to have a sufficiently stable and pre-
theoretically identifiable subject matter. Criteria of competent usage will concern
which (basic) assertions and (basic) patterns of inference are, by standards of compe-
tence, permissible, mandated or forbidden. And, the thought is, (some core of) these
provide a body of non-negotiable, pre-theoretically given, subject matter-fixing data.
Needless to say, there will be questions about whether any facts established through
usage have this status and how we can recognize those that do. And many will be
especially hostile to the candidacy if we label the intended constraints as what is an-
alytic of the modal operators in question. But even Quine (1953) recognizes (in the
non-modal case, of course, of identity) that subject-matter-fixing considerations are
something of a sine qua non, and our aim here is to register all reasonable candidates.
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I shall now comment briefly on the likely extent and effect of such considerations in
the modal cases.
I venture that such considerations (always) settle the question of whether a
modality under study is — and so ought to be treated in the semantic theory as
— alethic: that is, as supporting necessity elimination and possibility introduction.
For, I suggest, if alethic status is not so settled (prior to semantic theorizing) we
do not have data of sufficient quality to circumscribe an appropriate subject matter.
Certainly, if alethic status is not settled by criteria of competent usage, it is quite
unclear how such modal idioms could be sufficiently disciplined to be viable, never
mind useful. So there are two semantic-theoretically tractable cases to consider. If
relevant data of usage circumscribe a non-alethic modality X, the selection of cer-
tain Kripke-structures as eligible and the subsequent application of a modal logic is
not ruled out. But that case leads into a realm of Kripke structures where we will
not follow. If relevant data of usage circumscribe an alethic modality, completeness
requires a structure in which accessibility is, at least, reflexive: a REF-structure or
above. However, it is natural to think that valuable although completeness may be,
what is non-negotiable for the selection of a logic for a given modal subject mat-
ter is that it should be sound. Indeed, it is often asserted that a logic that is known
to be incomplete is the right logic for a subject matter even when it is also known
that it has “rivals” that are known to be complete.35 What we need to do to settle
soundness is to settle the question of whether, for a particular alethic modal subject
matter, more than reflexivity is attributable to the accessibility relation. To that end,
relevant considerations will naturally be sought by searching further under the head-
ing of criteria of competent usage. But is not within my present remit to pursue that
search.
5.4. The Consequences for Modal Logic of Modally Significant Relations
The question of the consequences for logic selection of subject matter fixing is one
that, clearly, applies quite generally and not just to modal logic and modal subject
matter. By contrast the next potential source of logic selection is not so general. It is
not so particular as to be a feature of only the modal case: for it is a (pure) feature of
all IDO and QUIOD modal structures and that means that it will figure in all applica-
tions of those structures with modalities being one such case. The source in question
is facts about relevant relations.
A familiar pattern of argument for the selection of a modal logic, and one that
is more at home at the theoretical end of our concerns with modality, proceeds as
follows: (A) identify a relation that is relevant to the given modal subject matter;
(B) establish the profile of that relation with respect to reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity; (C) identify the Kripke structure that embeds that profile and (D) con-
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clude that the right modal logic for the subject-mater in question is that which is
sound and complete with respect to that model structure. Thus one might seek to
conclude that the right logic for nomological modality is S5, because the key relation
is w has exactly the same laws as v, that expresses an equivalence relation and that
profile defines the S5 structure. Or, one might seek to conclude that the right logic
of metaphysical modality is S4 because: (further lemma) metaphysical modality is
combinatorial; the key relation is v is generable from the fundamental elements of w;
that relation is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric and that profile defines the
S4 structure.36 To reiterate intent, my immediate remit is not to scrutinize cases but
rather to comment on the rules of the game. And I have two such comments.
Firstly, then, it is evident that more than one relation will be relevant to the given
subject matter. In the case of nomological modality, for example, we also have no
law of w is violated at v. Presumably we can rely on the factivity of lawhood to make
this reflexive, but it is certainly not symmetric or transitive and so it does not have a
profile that selects the S5 structure (but rather selects M). Perhaps the only sensible
thing to say in this light is that we have a suite of nomological modalities — generated
by different relations that are eligible for the nomological accessibility role — rather
than embrace the project of pinning down the one true nomological modality. But
the primary methodological significance of the phenomenon is that we have reason
to be sceptical in general of the inevitability of finding an applied semantics (and
an ensuing logic) that correctly and uniquely does justice to all the concerns and
interests of our pre-semantic modalzing in and around a given territory, such as the
nomological.
Secondly, one must consider whether any prospective accessibility relation really
is a proper candidate for holding sway throughout all models. Lest the point be mis-
construed, the IDO and QUIDO structures are, of course, set-up so that whatever is
put in the R-role has that breadth of significance: it must be apt to extend over all the
possible worlds in a model and its holding in all models is what defines the struc-
ture. But, at first glance at least, it is not obvious that there is good reason to take it
that such just any structural fact about the relatedness of possible worlds within the
intended model is eligible to have the significance that an accessibility relation must
have: that is in constraining admissibility on all models. What the intended model
might well settle, and in any case let us grant that it does, is that it is not a contin-
gent matter that a given relation (say the combinatorial relation mentioned above)
is symmetric. But equally it will be settled by the intended model that (say) Water’s
containing Hydrogen is a non-contingent matter. However, the necessity of Water’s
containing Hydrogen is not something that it would be apt to represent as holding
in every admissible model of metaphysical necessity. This leads us back towards the
difficult territory of what our expectations of models are and what their role is in an
impure Kripke semantics for modal logic. But I trust that enough has been offered to
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show that there is good cause to pause for thought here. And among related ways
of stimulating that thought may be to pose this related questions. Ought we be dis-
tinguishing here between what is necessarily true of relations and what is true of
relation-expressing predicates in virtue of the meanings that they have? And ought
we be inferring from these considerations that, depending on their “source” some
necessities are projectible across the hyperspace of models while others are not. In
any case, eligibility for the role of accessibility relation requires such projectibility
and the proponent of any candidate for the role ought to be prepared to back the
kind of argument outlined above by a defence of such projectibility.
5.5. Modal Logic Without a Description of the Accessibility Relation?
Given the kinds of descriptions of relations on possible worlds that we are used to it
is, at least typically, not difficult to determine status with respect to symmetry and
transitivity. And accordingly, whenever an IDO structure or QUIDO structure is deter-
mined a modal logic thereby determined too. But there are at least two ways in which
we might find ourselves in a position that falls short of meeting the requirement to
describe the accessibility relation for the structure. And it is not obviously irrational
to hold out hope of access to an effective impure semantic theory for the modality
while consciously occupying that position.
Firstly, one might wish to select by their consequences unmediated hypotheses
of symmetry, transitivity or both. This might be born of either despair or agnosticism
about pinning down the right description of the right relation. But, in any event, the
initial idea would be to hypothesize (say) transitivity without describing a relation
and showing that the relation so described is transitive. The follow-up would be to
endorse one such hypothesis in light of its “pay-off”.
Secondly, on a subtly different note, one might — again out of despair or agnos-
ticism — think that the best we can say is this: even if there is a fact of the matter
about the nature of the accessibility relation for this alethic modality, we may never
be in a position to assert confidently what that fact is beyond asserting that it is reflex-
ive (that much being settled by non-negotiable facts about the identity of the subject
matter). In that case one would be in a position to deploy the M-rules in confidence
of their soundness, but not of their completeness. And therefore, one would not be
in a position to make a claim about which is the right logic for that modality.
There is a rich seam to be explored here and — again — it is not my present
purpose to explore it. But I shall take a liberty of partiality in elaborating the position
of those who are inclined to take M as the default logic in use for all alethic modalities.
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5.6. In Brief Support of the Default Use of M
The salient consequence of having at our disposal only such a weak logic as M is
that we have to recognize the distinctness, in a certain sense, of infinitely many com-
plex modes of the given modality. M allows us, always, to intervene in a chain of
modal operators according to the alethic laws, by introducing an outer ◊ (possibility
introduction) or eliminating an outer  (necessity elimination). But there is no such
general facility to eliminate an outer possibility operator (from ◊ to , or ◊◊ to
◊) or to introduce an outer necessity operator (from ◊ to ◊, or  to ). So the
overall effect is that various chains of modal operators are not logically equivalent
to any shorter or simpler chain. Thus, given only M, logically distinct modes of X-
modality are represented by each of the infinitely many syntactically distinct chains:
◊A, ◊◊A . . . A, A, . . . ◊A, ◊A . . . ◊A, ◊A . . . A, ◊A . . . A, ◊A . . . ). This
may, then, seem a significant disadvantage “of economy” when compared with the
stronger modal logics in the field and especially (taking the strongest) S5 where
equivalence results allow reduction to only a few logically distinct modes: A, ∼A, ◊A,
◊∼A, ∼A, A.37 But let us be clear about what is common ground between the M-
hypothesis and the S5-hypothesis and about why any residual discrepancy should be
judged significant.
The first common consequence is that all well-formed formulas (of arbitrary
length) will have an interpretation in accordance with the fully compositional assign-
ment procedures that the impure semantic theory inherits from the pure. So all rel-
evant formulas are (declared) meaningful on both hypotheses. The second common
consequence is metaphysical: no ideological commitment to complex modal states
(of the kind intimated by iterated modal operators) ensues. On the S5-hypothesis
the question, we might say, does not arise, since semantic analysis weeds out iter-
ation. The M-hypothesis does not resolve the matter in that way and so, certainly,
leaves semantically open the question of such a commitment. But what does not fol-
low from the M-sanction of various chains of operators as semantically primitive is
commitment to assert any closed sentence in which such chains have wide scope.
In particular, the M-hypothesis does not involve a commitment to assert sentences
of any syntactic type other than those that are semantically primitive on the S5-
hypothesis. We should not, of course expect of a (hypothesis of) commitment to a
logic to have any such substantive assertoric commitments. But we are in a region
where the methodology has to be made explicit, and a reminder also steers us away
from error.
There is however, a discrepancy of practical potential. For S5 offers greater in-
ferential facility with iterated modalities than does M: the former allows us to make
inferences from premises and to conclusions over a greater range of iterated modal
forms. But in the face of that (undisputed) observation it is inevitable that the de-
Principia 20(1): 1–44 (2016).
38 John Divers
fender of M will attempt to put pressure on the idea that we can expect much, if
anything, in the way of fulfilment of that potential. And she will naturally attempt to
do so by emphasizing the narrowness and remoteness of the range of circumstances
in which such iterations are assertible or in which anything turns on their assertibility.
To begin with the hardest hitting of observations there is no shortage of cases
in which it is doubtful that competent usage even permits iteration. Can one prop-
erly assert that it is analytically necessary that it is analytically necessary that P? For
that looks like claiming that “it is analytically necessary that P” is true in virtue of the
meanings of the expressions it contains. No less dubious is the assertion that it is phys-
ically necessary that it is physically necessary that P. For that looks like claiming that
“it is physically necessary that P” has the same status in respect of physical modality
as does “Nothing travels faster than light”. But how could that be? The claim here is
emphatically not that such iterations are meaningless. And remember that under the
M-hypothesis we are precisely committed to an impure semantic theory that assigns
them (non-arbitrary, compositionally generated) truth-conditions. If further charac-
terization of the flaw is wanted, perhaps it is that such iterations are (meaningful)
category mistakes. But the bottom line is that there is no foreseeable circumstance
in which one would be motivated to make such an assertion nor, accordingly, to take
it as a premise when the aim was to get at the modal truth by executing inference
that is taken to be sound. Granted, in the case of other modalities in which we have
a practical or theoretical interest there is no such compelling basis to allege that a
category mistake is afoot. And the most compelling case in that respect may well be
that of metaphysical modality. But being acquitted of the charge of category error
is not to be cleared of all charges of lacking clear conditions of assertibility. The de-
fender of M will prosecute an interest in the question of whether, for example, it is
metaphysically necessary that Water contains Hydrogen. For that will be co-ordinate
with her preparedness to appeal to the non-modal proposition necessitated without
reservation in reasoning from any suppositions. But it will strike her as perverse that
her skepticism about necessity in such a case, and her inferential dispositions altered,
might properly be dissolved on the strength of an attempt to sell her the oddity which
is the proposition that it is possibly possible that it is necessary that Water contains
Hydrogen. In the central case of epistemologically significant inference we proceed
from what we take ourselves to have the greater justification for asserting and that
does not promise a great career for iterated modalities in being fed into strong modal
logics to generate basic modal conclusions. In sum, skepticism about modal logics
that are stronger than M has a decent working basis in default skepticism about the
assertibility conditions of the discrepant iterative modes themselves.
This, I hope to have shown, is but one of many important and philosophical issues
that are raised by Kripke’s classic paper and that remain ripe for exploration half a
century on.
Principia 20(1): 1–44 (2016).
Philosophical Issues from Kripke’s ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’ 39
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Cezar Mortari and his team for the invitation to present the core of this
material at the Ninth Principia International Symposium in Florianopólis and to those who
took part in that discussion. I am also grateful for having had the opportunity to air further
parts of the material at the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind at the University of Leeds and
for subsequent comments from Simon Hewitt, Gail Leckie and Scott Shalkowski.
References
Barcan, C. 1946. A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication. Journal of
Symbolic Logic 11: 1–16.
Blackburn, P., van Benthem, J. & Wolter, F. (eds.) 2006. Handbook of Modal Logic. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Carnap, R. 1947. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Davidson, D. 1977. Reality Without Reference. Dialectica 31(3–4): 247–58.
———. 1978. What Metaphors Mean. Critical Inquiry 5(1): 31–47.
Divers, J. 1995. Modal Fictionalism cannot Deliver Possible-Worlds Semantics. Analysis
55(2): 81–9.
———. 2002. Possible Worlds. London: Routledge.
———. 2004. Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49: 659–84.
———. 2006. Possible-Worlds Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach.
Mind 115: 187–225.
Fine, K. 1978. Postscript. In: Prior & Fine1978, 116–61.
Forbes, G. 1985. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Clarendon.
———. 1989. The Languages of Possibility. Oxford: Blackwell.
Frege, G. 1892. On Sense and Reference. In: A Frege Reader. Beaney, M. (ed). Blackwell:
Oxford 1997, p.151–71.
Hale, B. 1996. Absolute Necessities. Philosophical Perspectives 99
Hintikkaa, J. 1961. Modality and Quantification. Theoria 27: 119–28.
Hodes, H. 1984. On Modal Logics which Enrich First-Order S5. Journal of Philosophical Logic
13: 423–54.
Hughes, G. & Cresswell, M. 1996. A New Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Routledge.
Kripke, S.A.1959. A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 24:
1–15
———. 1963. Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 83–
94.
———. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell
Lewis, D. 1968. Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophy 65:
113–26.
———. 1986. On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell
Linsky, B. & Zalta, E. 1994. In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic. Philosophical
Perspectives 8: 431–58.
Principia 20(1): 1–44 (2016).
40 John Divers
———. 1996. In Defense of the Contingently Non-Concrete. Philosophical Studies 84: 283–
94.
McFetridge, I. 1990. Logical Necessity: Some Issues. In: Logical Necessity and Other Essays.
Aristotelian Society Series Volume 11. London: Longdunn Press, 135–54.
Nolan, D. 2013. Impossible Worlds. Philosophy Compass 8: 360–72.
Plantinga, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon.
Prior, A. N. 1956. Modality and Quantification in S5. Journal of Symbolic Logic 21: 60–2.
———. 1957. Time and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Prior, A. N. & Fine, K.1978. Worlds, Times and Selves. London: Duckworth.
Quine, W. V. O. 1953. Reference and Modality. In: From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge,
Massachussets: Harvard University Press, p.139–59.
———. 1969. Speaking of Objects. In: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York:
Columbia University Press, p.1–25
———. 1972. Review of Milton K. Munitz (ed.) Identity and Individuation. Journal of Phi-
losophy 69: 488–97.
———. 1980. Postscript On Metaphor. In: Theories and Things. Cambridge, Massachussets:
Harvard University Press, p.187–9
Rosen, G. 1990. Modal Fictionalism. Mind 99: 327–54.
Salmon, N. 1984. Impossible Worlds. Analysis 44: 114–7.
Stalnaker, R. 2012. Mere Possibilities. Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1950. On Referring. Mind 59: 320–44.
Williamson, T. 1998. Bare Possibilia. Erkenntnis 48: 257–73.
———. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
JOHN DIVERS
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science
University of Leeds
Leeds, ENGLAND LS2 9JT
j.divers@leeds.ac.uk
Notes
1 When references take the form of names of page numbers alone, they are to Kripke (1963).
2 Contrast the possible-worlds semantic theory of Lewis (1968) whose aim is to provide in-
sights into the meanings of modal expressions without buying into the project of interpreting,
or even recognizing, any special logic of modality. It is made abundantly clear in the opening
sentences of Lewis (1968, p.113) that such a contrast is intended. Certainly, the resources
of counterpart theory that are deployed in Lewis (1968) might be deployed by others who
have in mind the Kripkean project of interpreting quantified modal logics: thus see Hughes &
Cresswell (1996, p.353–8). But the Kripkean logical project and Lewisian non-logical project
are different projects, any connections between which need to be established by argument.
3 Kripke (p.63) writes, “Truth-functional tautologies” and while we know that the two char-
acterizations are equivalent in extension, I prefer to avoid all semantic vocabulary in the
syntactic phase of development.
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4 Another natural differentiator of sets is, of course, (further) measures of cardinality: but
there is no cause to consider those here.
5 The effect of considering only REF structures is to ensure the VALidity in all structures of
those principles that are conjointly characteristic of the alethic modalities — thus: A ⊃ ◊A
and A⊃ A. So when it comes to modal applications, in due course, the restriction to alethic
modalities is the default presumption.
6 By contrast, in relation to the logic of provability, Kripke does exploit the full IDO+ struc-
tures to make the de-relativizing move that I have described (p.71). In that, far less discussed,
phase of the paper, and displaying his mathematical sensibilities, Kripke is happy to consider
IDO+ structures in which the elements of the K-set are further models!
7 Another kind of semantic facility is afforded by the IDO+ expansion if we add certain further
operators to the language. In that event, the distinguished K-member, G, is apt to play an
essential role in the evaluation clause for such an operator. An application-neutral term for
such operators is fixed-point operators. But peeking again behind the veil of purity, in modal
applications such operators are Actuality operators of the rigidifying, or return-key, type (see
Hodes 1984). In this paper, and again remaining faithful to the remit of Kripke (1963), there
will be no discussion of these more exotic modal logics nor of the semantic issues they add.
8 There is no value in proliferating species nomenclature at this stage.
9 The shift to admitting variant-domain structures was motivated by a reconception, in Kripke
(p.65), of the proof theory for QUIDO logics. Kripke (1959) took Prior (1956) to have pro-
vided a proof in good standing of the Barcan Formula (BF) and realized that this formula
would further be validated only if downward domain variation were inadmissible. (Valida-
tion of CBF requires ruling out upward variation). The later view that Prior’s attempt is not a
proof in good-standing deprives BF of its status as a theorem and, so, of its power to require,
in the name of completeness, VALidity-ensuring restrictions on models.
10 To indicate the flexibility of the resources offered by Kripke structures I shall mention some
cases that have been exploited in various developments of the applied semantics of modality.
Since pure characterizations threaten to be lengthy and cumbersome I shall resort to im-
pure characterizations, noting that the impure characterizations are dispensable throughout.
Thus, consider each of the following generalizations of which the Kripkean species is a special
sub-species: (i) models containing non-classical assignment functions in which closed formu-
las are taken at each K-member onto one subset of {T, F}, allowing for value gaps and value
gluts; (ii) models containing counterpart-theoretic evaluation of open formulas at a world,
where evaluation via transworld identity is a special case of such evaluation that is permitted
when structures tolerate intersecting K-domains; (iii) models in which the fundamental form
of evaluation is of a sequence in which the first element is itself a sequence thus — evaluation
at a K-member in the model is a special case of evaluation of a centred K-member, such as
〈H, o〉, in the model where o ∈ ψ(H) and (iv) model structures in which the set of possible
worlds, K , is a proper subset of the set of all worlds in the space, W , that broader set con-
taining also impossible worlds. Kripke remarks explicitly, and then only briefly, on case (i),
contrasting his own thoroughly bivalent approach with the alternative that he takes to be
suggested by Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950) and implemented by Hintikka (1961) and
Prior (1957). This is the occasion of his “convention” remark quoted above. I read Kripke as
alluding to case (ii), and the prospect of counterpart-theoretic development, in his remarks
about the prospect of a broader of identity (p.70).
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11 The natural path of construction is from QUIDO structures to QUIDO+ structures and then
to distinguished QUIDO+ models. But it is formally available to distinguish in either one of
these ways without distinguishing in the other. That is, we can take an IDO or QUIDO struc-
ture in which there is no distinguished W-member and distinguish a model in that structure.
Or we can, as Kripke (1963) does, take IDO+ and QUIDO+ structures in which there is a
distinguished W-member but decline to invoke a distinguished model of the structure. That
is formally unobjectionable but not obviously well motivated even from the pure standpoint
never mind the impure modal standpoint.
12 The “pro tem” qualification is there so as to not rule out at this stage, and without argu-
ment, the prospect of an attempted ontological deflation by re-interpretation of the whole
theory. See 4.9 below.
13 For present purposes, I again, put aside issues of cardinality and attitudes to various in-
finities. If taking into account all live philosophical positions on such matters one could not
so casually rely on ontological commitment to (a plurality of) sets generating further com-
mitment to a set that is their union. I am indebted here to Simon Hewitt.
14 In writing of one kind of theory (impure) being an instance of the other (pure) I am not
expressing serious intent about the metaphysics of theories. Perhaps a more accurate way of
articulating the relationship is that the pure theory is a pure set-theoretic representation of
the arbitrary impure theory. But I shall forego that more cumbersome way of speaking.
15 For a range of examples of applications of (what they call) “modal logics” to non-modal
subject matters see Blackburn, van Benthem & Wolter (2006).
16 My present policy on usage is, thus, at odds with reasonably common practice in philoso-
phy, and certainly outside of it, whereby “modal” is used to label any IDO or QUIDO logics and
“possible-worlds semantics” to label any interpretation that deploys pure QUIDO structures
(or variants on these). See the very title of Blackburn et al (2006). I have already advertised
the advantages of my policy.
17 To underscore the point by means of contrast, it is — of course — a perfectly legitimate
project to set out with a notion of “logical” that derives from logic and to argue that logically
modal space is absolute or maximal in some way or other. See, for example, Hale (1996)
following McFetridge (1990).
18 This line of thought raises a major question about commitment to worlds other than pos-
sible worlds and I shall return to that below.
19 Recall the presumption from the outset that all species of model structure include a non-
empty set K.
20 I am putting out of the picture of modal application the pure option of having models in
which the domain of the distinguished K-element is empty. But a comprehensive discussion
would cover, and may make something of, that case.
21 Here and throughout this phase, I continue to presume, with Kripke (1963), reflexivity of
the accessibility relation, R, as a feature of all model structures.
22 A notable consequence of this observation is that commitment to a range of necessities
and impossibilities, when combined with agnosticism only about contingency, may avoid
commitment to a plurality of possible worlds when combined with a Kripkean possible-worlds
semantic theory (Divers 2006).
23 It is noted that a commitment, in the realm of truth, to such contingent non-existence is
equivalent to commitment to the invalidity of the converse Barcan Formula (CBF).
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24 Counterpart-theoretic versions of possible-worlds semantics, following Lewis (1968), of-
fer the prospect of de re contingency within one-world models (Divers 2004, p.673ff). That
is because a single possible world can represent both the possibility of x being F and the
possibility of x being non-F through one counterpart of x being F and another being non-F .
Naturally, the rules governing the operator “at w” require careful handling if that prospect is
pursued, lest such a world should also represent the “possibility” that x be both F -and-non-F .
25 The defence of necessary existence (necessitism) and its consequence in a broadly Krip-
kean semantic context is undertaken by Linsky & Zalta (1994, 1996) and subsequently by
Williamson (1998, 2013). On these views there are no non-actualized possibilia, but the ac-
tualized possibilia that are postulated are plenitudinous.
26 The idea that commitment to impossble worlds is driven by commitment to modal truth
is an increasingly popular idea that goes back at least to Salmon (1984). See Nolan (2013)
on the extensive literature. To exemplify, it is often suggested that we need to introduce im-
possible worlds in order to register the falsehood of various modal conditionals that would
wrongly be deemed true if their truth-conditions were given by the standard semantic eval-
uation clauses and had we only possible worlds over which to evaluate them. So one driving
commitment is to the Falsehood of at least some such conditionals that have (necessary con-
sequents or) impossible antecedents — thus, “If a proof were to appear of the finitude of
the set of primes, mathematicians would not be surprised”. But those considerations take us
beyond the concerns of Kripke (1963) and of this paper.
27 It might prove illuminating to attempt to relate the relevant requirements of the theory to
the intuition about models with which it aligns. But I shall not pursue that option here.
28 Stalnaker (2012, p.3–4) comes very close to such insistence. But perhaps he is relying on
some kind of suppressed inductive considerations about how projects of a certain type, inti-
mated again by possible-worlds semantics, tend to pan out whenever they prove worthwhile.
29 I would prefer to forgo the qualification of truth as literal, since I do not think that there are
any non-literal kinds of truth. But experience suggests that the qualifier may insure against
misunderstanding of the intention.
30 The literal representationalism described here might be thoroughgoing in applying uni-
formly to the results or theorems of the theory and to the axioms from which they are de-
duced. However, it is to be noted that for theories in general and for semantic theories in
particular, it s not unusual to find partially representationalist conceptions involving literal-
ism about theorems and instrumentalism about axioms. See Davidson (1980) for such a view
of semantics in general and Stalnaker (2012) for, what appears to be, a view that is at least
in this spirit about possible-worlds semantics in particular.
31 It is granted that support for modal epistemology tends to be off the radar of discussions
of applied semantics for QML. But it is an interesting question, and one that bears on my
claims about presumptions, why this is so.
32 For criticism of prefix fictionalism in this regard see Divers (1995).
33 The point is even more graphically illustrated by a related and familiar explanatory project
that is adjacent to our immediate concerns. If the aim is to provide an ontological reduction
of — say the properties — by identifying them as sets of possibilia one cannot sensibly claim
to have done so while preparing to disavow the prima facie commitment to the existence of
possibilia.
34 Moves of re-interpretation, of a certain kind, within the confines of the pure semantics are,
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of course, a different matter altogether. The algebra of structures is a perfectly good discipline
and trades in re-interpretation, of a kind, to establish (on the back of embedding or isomor-
phism) the transferability of results about one kind of structure to equivalent results about
related structures. But nothing in that sphere involves either the benefits or the commitments
that attach distinctively to impure possible-worlds semantic theories.
35 This is a matter that, of course, looms large for the champions of second-order versions of
modal logics since second-order status itself makes for incompleteness. Thus, for example,
see the recent defence by Williamson (2013) of second order quantified S5 as the right logic
for absolute necessity and possibility. I hope to discuss that particular development in some
detail elsewhere.
36 For discussion and sources see Divers (2002, p.215–6).
37 See Hughes & Cresswell (1996, p.59–60)
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